Socio-Legal Review
Volume 6

Issue 1

Article 2

September 2022

Max Weber on Property: An Effort in Interpretative Understanding
Laura R. Ford

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.nls.ac.in/slr

Recommended Citation
Ford, Laura R. (2022) "Max Weber on Property: An Effort in Interpretative Understanding," Socio-Legal
Review: Vol. 6: Iss. 1, Article 2.
Available at: https://repository.nls.ac.in/slr/vol6/iss1/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Socio-Legal Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact library@nls.ac.in.

MAX WEBER ON PROPERTY:

AN

EFFORT IN INTERPRETIVE

UNDERSTANDING
Laura R. Ford*
In this article, Laura Ford explores Max Weber' writings on the
subject of property. Weber, in his first dissertation, articulated
legalyl and historically, the conception of property as a phenomenon
that was dependent on organised social relationshjps and somewhat
closed to outside participation.Later, he formulated this conception
sociologicalyl and systematicaly connected it to additional concepts.
Ford engages with Weber' work in three broadphases (the legal
phase of his first dissertation, the economic-historicalphase and
finally the sociologicalphase) in order to examine if any sociological
issues emerge from the same.
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INTRODUCTION
Throughout the academic world, renewed interest in property and "property
rights" is evident.

Within certain economic quarters, the writings of Ronald

Coase have been responsible for something approaching a paradigm shift,' with

1

See

THOMAS

S.

KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS

(1962).

25

(3d ed.
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a focus on property rights and "transaction costs" in their exchange at the core.2
Although discussion of property has been fundamental to political theory since
its inception, widespread application of "neo-liberal" principles in the context
of international development finance which have emphasized the importance
of stable, private property rights has motivated political scientists, development
economists, and public policy theorists to direct increasing attention to propertyrights regimes.3 Within legal science, property sits at the heart of continental
and common-law legal systems, as well as legal systems that these propertybased systems have influenced. Within the social sciences, recent attention to
property is evident in anthropology and economic sociology.
2

See

PROPERTY RIGHTS: COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND LAW

(Terry L. Anderson &

Fred McChesney eds. 2003) (hereinafter "PROPERTY RIGHTS"); YORAM

BARZEL, A THEORY

OF THE STATE: ECONOMIC RIGHTS, LEGAL RIGHTS, AND THE SCOPE OF THE STATE

(2002);

ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WrrHOUT LAw: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES

(1991);

ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR

AcTION (1990); YORAM BARZEL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
(2d ed. 1997) (1989); R. H. Coase, THE FIRM, THE MARKET AND THE LAW (1988);
DOUGLASS C. NORTH, STRUCTURE AND CHANGE IN EcoNoMIC HISTORY (1981).
Some readers might question the validity of characterizing these developments as a
"paradigm shift" in Kuhn's sense. In response to such doubts, it is worth noting that,
CoLLECTIvE

throughout The Structure of Scientfic Revolutions, Kuhn repeatedly stated that paradigm

3

4

shifts need not occur on a macro scale in order to be so characterized, but rather
more typically appear as regularized, small-scale changes in the basic conceptual
commitments within a community of scientific practitioners. See e.g. KUHN, supra
note 1, at 6-7, 180-81. Indeed, it would not be difficult to describe the transition to
an economic "property rights" paradigm in Kuhnian terms. Such an account would
describe a crisis in the "normal science" of neoclassical economics provoked by
problems of "public goods" and "externalities," and the increasing "recognition" that
a conception of private property rights, or "ownership," underlies the neoclassical
economics paradigm. For an exceptionally clear statement of this, see Harold
Demsetz, Ownershp and the Externality Problem, in PROPERTY RIGHTS 282-300.
See, e.g., Jean Rogers, Property, Power and Growth (Center for International Private
Enterprise 2003), availableathttp://www.cipe.org/pdf/publications/fs/jeanrogers.pdf;
HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL (2000). Moreover, the ascendance
of "rational choice theory" perspectives in political science has led to increasing
interchange among "property rights" scholars in political science and economics. See,
e.g., William H. Riker & Itai Sened, A Political Theory of the Ongin of Property Rights:
Airport Slots, 35 AM. J. POL. SCI. 951 (1991).
See Neil Fligstein & Jennifer Choo, Law and Corporate Governance, 1 ANN. REV. L. &
Soc. Sci. 61 (2005); Annelise Riles, Property as Legal Knowlege: Means and Ends, 10 J
Roy. ANTHROP. INST. LAw 775 (2004); ANTHROPOLOGY, AND THE CONSTITUTION OF
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In the case of contemporary sociology, however, the subject of property
has been generally neglected until quite recently, as Richard Swedberg has noted.
Even the recent discussions of property within economic sociology, moreover,
have not focused on the sociological nature of property, but have rather focused
on its effects, viewing it in a manner generally consistent with neo-institutional
economic theory.' This is true despite the fact that Emile Durkheim and Max
Weber both devoted considerable attention to the nature of property in their
published works.
THE SOCIAL: MAKING PERSONS AND THINGS

(Alain Pottage & Martha Mundy eds.

2004); Victor Nee & Yang Cao, Path Dependent Societal Transformation: Stratification in
Hybrid Mixed Economies, 28 THEORY & Soc'Y 799 (1999); PROPERTY RELATIONS:

(C.M. Hann ed. 1998); Victor Nee &
Peng Lian, Sleeping With the Enemy: A Dynamic Model of Declining PoliticalCommitment in
State Socialism, 23 THEORY & Soc'Y 253 (1994).
RICHARD SWEDBERG, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY 203 (2003); see also ALVIN
GOULDNER, THE COMING CRISIS OF WESTERN SOCIOLOGY 304-13 (1970).
One
important exception is Jens Beckert, who has recently published work on the sociology
of inheritance law, as well as a number of other property-related topics. See JENS
BECKERT, INHERITED WEALTH (2008) (originallypublished in German as UNVERDIENTES
VERMC)GEN: SOZIOLOGIE DES ERBRECHTS (2004)); The Longue Durie of Inheritance Law:
Discourses and InstitutionalDevelopmentin France, Germany, and the United States, 48 ARCHIVES
EUROPEENNES DE SOCIOLOGIE (2007). For a recent review article, which reinforces the
point that property has been generally neglected in contemporary sociology, while also
formulating certain prescriptions for future sociological work, see Bruce G. Carruthers
& Laura Ariovich, The Sociology of Property Rights, 30 ANN. Soc. REV. 23 (2004).
It is important to note thatJames Coleman's theoretical work has generally emphasized
the importance of "resources" and "rights," and thus may constitute a significant
exception to the argument that contemporary sociological theory has tended to ignore
property. See, e.g., JAMES S. COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY (Harvard
Paperback ed. 1994) (1990). Coleman's theoretical work has been heavily influenced
by rational choice theory, especially economic theory. See id. Thus his emphasis on
property is very likely a reflection of the overall developments in economic theory
that are described suprain note 2. Ronald Coase and other founders of the "property
rights" perspective in economic theory are cited liberally throughout his theoretical
work, and the paradigmatic problems of "free ridership" and "externality" are
correspondingly emphasized. See id. at 27-64.
See, e.g., THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN SOCIOLOGY (Mary C. Brinton & Victor Nee
eds. 1998).
See EMILE DURKHEIM, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CIvic MORALS 121-70 (Cornelia
Brookfield trans., 2d ed., 1992) (1957); EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DivIsION OF LABOR
IN SOCIETY (Free Press Paperback ed. 1997) (1893). The writings of Max Weber on
property will be discussed infra.
RENEWING THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL TRADITION

5

6
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The purpose of this article will be to explore Max Weber's writings on
property, in an effort to trace the development of his thinking on the subject
and to identify whether coherent sociological themes emerge. This is an
immensely challenging task. References to property are pervasive throughout
Weber's work, from his dissertation to the compilation that is Economy and
Society. Moreover, the subject of property goes to the heart of Weber's
multiple areas of expertise: law, economics, public administration, and
sociology. Thus the investigator is faced with Weber at the pinnacle of his
precision and subtlety. For a person educated in the 21st Century, these
difficulties are compounded by the challenge of understanding detailed
analogies and distinctions drawn by Weber, as a late 19 th-Century thinker,
among (1) his contemporary German-Prussian socio-legal framework, (2)
multiple medieval socio-legal frameworks, and (3) ancient socio-legal
frameworks, particularly those of Greece and Rome. From a purely legal
("doctrinal") perspective, such a task seems virtually impossible, since the
law in question includes property, contract, bankruptcy, corporations, public
administrative law, and family law, as well as jurisprudential theory.
However, from his first dissertation, Weber was explicit in stating that his
interest was not primarily doctrinal (or "dogmatic,"' to use his terminology),
nor was it historical, in the sense of merely describing the commercial-historical

8

MAx WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY

(Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., University of California Press 1978) (1968).
For discussions of the compilation and its contents, see RICHARD SWEDBERG, MAX
WEBER AND THE IDEA OF ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY 153-62, 197-203 (1998); compare

Overview of the Text of Economy and Sodety by the Editors of the Max Weber Gesamtausgabe,
1 MAx WEBER STUDIES 104 (2000) with Hiroshi Orihara, From a Torso with a Wrong
Head to Five Disjointed Body-Parts Without a Head: A Critique of the EditorialPoliy for
Max Weber Gesamtausgabe 1/22, 3 MAX WEBER STUDIES 133 (2003). See also infra note
223 to 230 and accompanying text.
9

In German legal literature, the term "dogmatic" generally denotes the binding
nature of a legally authoritative text. See, e.g. FRANZ WIEACKER, A HISTORY OF
PRIVATE LAW IN EUROPE WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO GERMANY 34 (Tony Weir
trans. 1995) (originally published as PRIVATRECHTSGESCHICHTE DER NEUZEIT, rev'd
ed. 1967) (1952).

28

Max Weber On Propery:An Effort In Interpretive Understanding

developments that paralleled particular legal frameworks. 0

Thus one cannot

simply rely on legal texts or commercial-historical facts in trying to understand
Weber's arguments. The necessity of interpreting Weber's German, as well as his
Latin and Romance legal sources, from an English-speaking perspective further
complicates matters. Such difficulties demand caution from any interpreter, and
create myriad opportunities for mistaken inferences and conclusions.
Yet, precisely for these reasons, there is much to be learned from Weber's
writings on property. His writings spanned an enormous historical range, and
took account of German jurisprudential, economic and social-historical thought
at its peak. His professors and advisors included many leading figures in German
jurisprudence, economics, and public administration, including Levin
Goldschmidt," Theodor Mommsen (1817-1903),12 and August Meitzen (18221910).13

Moreover, as will become evident, much of contemporary property

See

MAX WEBER, ZUR GESCHICHTE DER HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN IM MITTELALTER,

10

as published in MAx WEBER, GESAMMELTE AUFSATZE ZUR SOZIAL- UND WIRTSCHAFTSGESCHICHTE 312 (1924) (hereinafter Handelsgesellschaften). The definitive edition of
this text has recently been published in German as part of the overarching Max
Weber Gesamtaugabe project. See MAx WEBER GESAMTAUSGABE, ZUR GESCHICHTE DER
HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN IM MITTELALTER (Gerhard Dilcher & Susanne Lepsius
eds.) (2008). The scholarly introductions written by the editors for each volume in
the Max Weber Gesamtausgabe series are invaluable sources for understanding the
particular texts in their historical context and in relation to Weber's other works.

12

13

Goldschmidt was Weber's primary advisor and mentor in writing his first dissertation.
See infra notes 18 to 29 and accompanying text.
According to the Nobel Foundation, which in 1902 awarded him a Nobel Prize in
Literature, Theodor Mommsen was "the greatest classical historian of the Nineteenth
Century." See The Nobel Foundation, Nobel Prizes by Year, The Nobel Prize in
Literature 1902, available at http://nobelprize.org/nobel prizes/literature/laureates/
1902/mommsen-bio.html. Mommsen's most frequently cited work is his multivolume
Historj of Rome, a work which is still in print today. However, he is credited with
authoring or editing over 1500 works, including a number of invaluable primary
sources in Roman law and social history. His degrees were in law and history; at
University of Berlin he was a member of the faculty of law. See ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 576-77 (1937, Volume X).
Meitzen was an agrarian historian and statistician. See ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES 302 (1937, Volume X). He had acquired distinction through his services to the
Prussian state, first in conducting an exhaustive study of Prussian agriculture and landtaxes, then through his labors in the administration's statistical bureau. See id. His Histor,
Theory, and Technique of Statistics (1891) has been translated by Roland P Falkner and is
currently available in a paperback reprint edition (BiblioLife). See also infra note 107.
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theory was prefigured in Weber's writing. Thus he is relevant both historically
and contemporarily. For these reasons, despite the enormous challenges
involved, this article will seek to draw much-deserved attention to Weber's
work on property.
Weber's scholarly work pertaining to property will be presented here as
proceeding in three distinct phases: (1) the legal phase of his first dissertation,
in which he first defined property in socio-relational terms and articulated a
number of themes to which he would return in later work; (2) the economichistorical phase, in which he articulated a narrative of fundamental historical
change in proprietary social relationships, bringing into bold relief the character
of agrarian property and the contrasting character of commercial property; and
(3) the sociological phase, in which Weber drew on the two prior phases to
articulate a sociological theory of property. The notion that Weber's propertyrelated work proceeded in three clearly-defined phases is distortive; legal,
historical, economic, and social elements are present from the beginning of his
work, and blended throughout his work in interesting ways. Nevertheless, the
distortion does enable a developmental understanding of the ways that Weber
conceptualized and analyzed property.
This developmental image of Weber's property-related scholarly work
reveals the extent to which his finally-developed, sociological theory of property
built on insights from his legal and economic-historical phases. As the reader
will see, Weber presented property as a phenomenon dependent on organized
social relationships that are to some extent closed to outside participants. This
conception was legally and historically articulated in the first dissertation. In
Economy and Society, this conception was sociologically formulated and
systematically connected to additional important concepts, particularly that of
"Order." A developmental presentation reveals the extent to which Weber's
property-related concepts were systematically and meticulously constructed over
the course of his lifetime. The fact that he could return to insights from his
early scholarship in articulating his sociological theory of property demonstrates
the strength of the legal and economic-historical foundation he built. It is to
that foundation that we now turn.
30
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1. THE LEGAL PHASE: THE FIRST DISSERTATION
PROPERTY AND ORGANIZED SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS

Translated literally, Weber's first dissertation has a descriptive, albeit
complex, title: "Development of the Soliday-Ijability-Prinajleandthe Separate-PropertyFund of the Public Mercantile-Associationfrom the Household-and-Craft-IndustUCommunities in the Italian Cities" (hereinafter the "Dissertation"). 4 Weber
successfully defended the Dissertation in 1889," and in the same year published
it as the third chapter in a larger work,'" which he titled On the HistoUof MercantileAssociationsin the MiddleAges (hereinafter "The Histor of Mercantile-Assoaations")."
Weber's dissertation chair (Doktorvater), a professor whose seminar had inspired
him to begin his research two years previously, was Levin Goldschmidt, a
renowned commercial law scholar.'" The significance of this fact may be more
fully appreciated once Goldschmidt's scholarship is approached from a
contemporary U.S. legal perspective.
Since the 1950's, U.S. commercial law has been dominated by the Uniform
Commercial Code (hereinafter the "UCC"). One of the core principles enshrined
in the UCC, a principle that U.S. first-year law students learn as a matter of
sacred doctrine, is deference to "trade usages" (i.e. commercial customs),' 9 which
are used to interpret the language of commercial agreements and to fill gaps in

14

Entwickelung des Solidarhaftpringzps und des Sondervermbgens der offenen Handelsgesellschaft
aus den Haushalts-und Gewerbegemeinschaften in den italienischen Stadten. See DIRK KASLER,
MAX WEBER: AN INTRODUCTION To His LIFE AND WORK 243 (Philippa Hurd trans.
1988) (originallypublished as EINFIDHRUNG IN DAS STUDIUM MAX WEBERS 1979).

15

See

16
17
18
19

LuTz KALBER, THE HISTORY OF COMMERCIAL PARTNERSHIPS IN THE MIDDLE AGES
9-10 (2003); KAsLER, supra notel4, at 6.
See KALBER, supra note 15, at 9-10.

See supra note 10.
See KALBER, supra note 15, at 6-10.
See, e.g., UCC § 1-102(2)(b) ("Underlying purposes and policies of this Act are.. .to
permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage and
agreement of the parties."); § 1-205(2) ('A usage of trade is any practice or method
of dealing having such regularity of observance in a place, vocation or trade as to
justify an expectation that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in
question.").
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those agreements. 20 Although the UCC's final text is a result of legislative
compromise, its foundational principles (and much of its text) were provided
by Karl Llewellyn, a German-American law professor with a deep understanding
of Continental-European legal thought. 2 ' As James Whitman has persuasively
argued, Llewellyn's abiding respect for "trade usages" was likely influenced by
Levin Goldschmidt, who as a participant in the drafting of the 1861 German
Commercial Code (Deutsche Handels-Gesetqbuch) had argued that "[u]nconditional
free pla for custom is a cardinalpointof viewfor the desired new phase of commenial law." 22
To Goldschmidt, commercial custom was an outgrowth and manifestation
of the collective will of the people (Volk) .23 The beneficent law-giver was the
man who enabled the "immanent," "natural law," emergent from the will of the
Volk and the particular fact-pattern, to be applied.2 4 The beauty of the "law
merchant" lex mercatonawas its relative independence from rationalistic; Roman-

20

See, e.g., UCC § 1-201(3) ("Agreement" means the bargain of the parties in fact as
found in their language or by implication from other circumstances including course
of dealing or usage of trade..."); § 1-205(3) ("A course of dealing between parties
and any usage of trade in the vocation or trade in which they are engaged or of

which they are or should be aware give particular meaning to and supplement or
21

qualify terms of an agreement.").
SeeJames Whitman, CommerdalLaw and the American Volk:A Note on Llewellyn' German

Sourcesfor the Unform CommerdalCode, 97 YALE L. J. 156, 166-70 (1987); Shael Herman,
Llewellyn the Civilian:Speculations on the Contributionof ContinentalExperienceto the Unform
Commerial Code, 56 TUL. L. REV. 1125, 1130-31 (1982).
22

Whitman, supra note 21, at 165 (quoting and translating LEVIN GOLDSCHMIDT, KRITIK
DES ENTWURFS HINES HANDELSGESETZBUCHS, 4 KRITISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT F.D. GESAMMTE
113 (1857)) (emphasis in original). Goldschmidt's influence on
Llewellyn's legal thought is seen in Llewellyn's approving quotation and gloss on
Goldschmidt in The Common Law Tradition. KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW
RECHTSWISSENSCHAFr

TRADITION

122 (1960).

Channeled through Llewellyn, Goldschmidt's legacy has

survived in U.S. commercial law. See WHITMAN, supra note 21; Arthur L. Corbin, A
Tribute to Karl Llewellyn, 71 Yale L.J. 805, at 811-12 (1962). Somewhat ironically,
however, Goldschmidt's survival is at the cost of a mistaken attribution. See WHITMAN,
supra note 21, at 158 n.16. Llewellyn mistakenly attributed his quote, not to

Goldschmidt's great life's-work, the Handbook of Commercial Law (see infra note 24)
23
24

from whence the quote actually comes, but rather to a less famous work. See id.
See id.
See LEVIN GOLDSCHMIDT, HANDBUCH DES HANDELSRECHTS 302 (3d ed. 1875) (1864).

32

Max Weber On Properly:An Effort In Interpretive Understanding

law influenced legal systems,2 preeminent cases of which are the Prussian Code
(1761) and the French Civil Code (1804). His passionate interest in the law
merchant and its relationship to Volk customs, led Goldschmidt to dedicate a
lifetime of study to "Handelsrecht," which may be translated as "Commercial
Law" or "Mercantile Law."2 6 By 1891, this lifetime study had culminated in a
Universal History of Mercantile Law.2 7 In the language often used to categorize
19' Century German legal scholars, Goldschmidt is considered a "Germanist,"
albeit one who acknowledged a greater influence by Roman law on local (i.e.
German) mercantile customs than some of his "Germanist" counterparts. 28 His
vision of the law merchant as a body of law emergent from mercantile custom
remains influential to this day. 29

A.

The Question: The Origin(s) of Modern Commercial Organization
Forms, and their Connection to Property-Relationship Structures

Viewed in this light, Weber's decision to write his Dissertation under
Goldschmidt takes on greater significance, and the substance of that study
becomes more comprehensible. In the introduction to The History of MercantileAssociations,Weber declared his work to be an investigation into medieval southEuropean mercantile customs (Handelsgebrauch, trade usages), based on an
examination of available original source-materials.30 Specifically, Weber stated
that he was interested in whether medieval south-European mercantile customs
resulted in completely new legal concepts through general acceptance and its
development into customary law or whether such customs were met by
transformed, but previously existent, legal institutions.3 ' In other words,
25

26
27

28
29

30
31

See

WHITMAN, supra note 21, at 162-66.
See MARY ELIZABETH BASILE ET AL., LEX MERCATORIA AND LEGAL PLURALISM: A LATE
THIRTEENTH-CENTURY TREATISE AND ITS AFTERLIFE (Introduction) 163-64 (1998).
See LEVIN GOLDSCHMIDT, UNIVERSALGESCHICHTE DES HANDELSRECHTS (1891); BASILE
ET AL, supra note 26, at 164 n.7.
See WHfMAN, supra note 21, at 159-65 & n.55; WIEACKER,

supra note 9, at 300-40, 366-67.
See Stephen E. Sachs, From St. Ives to Cyberspace: The Modern Distortion of the Medieval
Law Merchant,' 21 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 685 (2006); see also supra note 22.
See WEBER, HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN, supra note 10, at 312-13.
See id. at 312.
33
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consistent with the interests of his dissertation chair (Goldschnidt), Weber had
undertaken a study of the relationship among mercantile customs, legal concepts
and legal institutions in medieval south-Europe, specifically Italy and Spain.
He was particularly interested in a subset relationship between custom and law:
the organization of persons for economic production and commercial activity,
and its consequences for property law (Vermgensrecht).
Consistent with the categories of German commercial law, embodied less
than three decades previously (1861) in the German Commercial Code,32 Weber
was interested in the origins of two types of commercial organization: (1) the
Public Mercantile-Association (offene Handelsgesellschaft) and (2) the Commenda33
Association (Kommanditgesellschaft).

Moreover, he was interested in the

relationship between these types and an ancient Roman type of commercial
organization, the societas.34 In distinguishing among these three types of
32

See DAs
DEN

ALLGEMEINE DEUTSCHE HANDELS-GESETZBUCH

MATERIALIEN UND

BORNEMANN,

BENUTZUNG

MIT ERLAUTERUNGEN NACH

DER SAMMTLICHEN VORARBEITEN

BALDECK, STROHN UND BQRGERS

VON

78-9, 117 (Berlin 1862) (hereinafter

"1861 HGB").
3

See WEBER, HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN, supra note 10, at 313-44. To facilitate ready
comparison with Anglo-U.S. legal categories for commercial organization, these are
often (and with variations) translated as "General Commercial Partnership" and
"Limited Partnership," respectively. See, e.g. NIGEL FOSTER & SATISH SULE, GERMAN
LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAWs 492-98 (3d ed. 2002) (1993); GERMAN COMMERCIAL CODE
& CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IN ENGLISH (Charles E. Stewart trans. 2001). In the
context of Weber's 1 9 ' Century historical analysis, however, such translations may
disguise more than they reveal. Under contemporary Anglo-American law, partnerships
are sharply contrasted with corporations, the distinguishing features of the latter
being the corporation's separate legal "personality" and shareholders' limited liability.
See, e.g., JAMES D. Cox & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 2003) (1995).
It is generally agreed that the precursor to the modern Anglo-American corporation
is the joint stock corporation, but the origins of the joint stock corporation have
been a matter of debate among legal historians. See M. Schmitthof, The Ongin of the
Joint-Stock Company, 3 U. TORONTO L.J. 74 (1939). Nevertheless, certain historians
have taken the position that "public companies" and "commenda" (analogues to offene
Handelsgesellschaftand Kommanditgesellschafl) were intermediate stages between ancient
Roman forms of business enterprise and the joint stock corporation, prefiguring in
certain respects modern forms of business enterprise, including the corporation. See
id, particularly at 79-92. To use the term "partnership" in translating "Gesellschaft'
may disguise the fact that Weber was making a similarly broad kind of argument.

34

See

WEBER, HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN,

supra note 10, at 313-44.
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commercial organization, his primary focus was on the distinctive propertyrelationships (Vermi jensbe.iebungen) including claims and obligations with respect
to non-associates, particularly creditors that were characteristic of these forms.
In fact, as will be shown, Weber viewed these distinctive property-relationship
structures as constitutive of the particular organizational forms.
Weber's historical point of departure was the socetas of Roman law.3 6
According to the Roman jurists," this association was essentially contractual in
nature: it created a relationship of reciprocal obligations (oblzgationes, from ob +
lgare, meaning to tie together, to unite) among the associates, which were
enforceable between them, but virtually irrelevant as far as third parties were
concerned.38 The association endured for as long the original associates remained

3

36
37

38

See id. at 314-19, 335-86.
See id. at 313-21.
In the context of a discussion of Roman law, the term "jurist" designates a learned
interpreter and expounder of the law, whose opinions (responsa) were taken to be
authoritative expressions of Roman civil law after the time of Caesar Augustus
(Octavian). See THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN 1.2 (rev'd English ed., Alan Watson ed.,
1998) (1985) (translation based on the Latin text of Theodor Mommsen, 1868)
(Latin text available at The Roman Law Library, http://webu2.upmf-grenoble.fr/Haiti/
Cours/Ak/index.htm) (533) (hereinafter "The Digest'); THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN
1.2.8 (Peter Birks & Grant McLeod trans. 1987) (including the Latin text of Paul
Kriger, 1867, upon which the translation is based) (533) (hereinafter "The Institutes of
Justinian"); THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS 1.2 (WM. Gordon & O.E Robinson trans. 1988)
(including the revised Latin text of E. Seckel & B. Kiibler, 1935 (1903) upon which the
translation is based) (-160-179) (hereinafter "The Institutes of Ga/us"). See also ANDREW
BoRKowsm, TEXTBOOK ON ROMAN LAW 34-8, 43-52 (2d ed. 1997) (1994).
The sodetas was an Obligation created by shared understanding (consensus, agreement).
See THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN at 111.22; THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUs at 111.135.
Roman jurists divided Roman law into three categories: the law of Persons (Personae),
the law of Things (Res), and the law of Actions (Actiones). See THE INSTITUTES OF
JUSTININN, supra note 37, at 1.2.12; THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS, supra note 37, at 1.8. The
law of Actions was roughly analogous to modern procedural law, and concerned the
methods for pursuing a claim. See THE INSTITUTES OFJUSTINIAN at IV.6.1; THE INSTITUTES
OF GAIus at IV1IV.4. The law of Persons addressed the social status of individuals,
a primary division being between slaves and free men. See THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN
at 1.3; THu INSTITUTES OF GAIus at 1.9. The law of Things related to corporeal (having
a physical body, i.e. tangible) and incorporeal (intangible) things, and divided those
things into such as were capable of being under the proprietary control of apaterjamikas
(patrimonium)and such as were beyond such capacity (extra patrimonium). See THE
INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN at 11.1-11.2; THE INSTITUTES OF GAIuS at 11.1-11.14.
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alive and retained a shared understanding, but might have a much shorter
duration if its purpose was limited or if the associates shared understanding
disappeared.39 For purposes of convenience, the associates might each put money
into a common fund, creating a kind of "common property" (res (arca) communis).40
However, from the perspective of third persons, neither the association nor its

The law of Obligations was a sub-category of the law of Things. See THE INSTITUTES
OF JUSTINIAN at 11.2; THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUs at 11.12-11.14. More specifically,
Obligations were viewed as one of several incorporeal Things whose essence lay in
their constitution by abstract right (ius, including the law/right of all peoples, lus

gentium) rather than by physical existence. See id. Obligations were considered to
arise either from delict (i.e. wrong to another person, analogous to the "tort" of
Anglo-American law) or from contract (i.e. the conclusion of business arrangements,
contractus). See THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN at 111.13; THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS at
111.88. Obligations arising from contract could be created by conduct, by spoken
words, by written documents, or by a shared understanding (consensus). See THE INSTITUTES
OFJUSTINIAN at 111.13; THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS at 111.89. Actions to enforce Obligations
were considered to exist between persons (inpersonas), rather than pertaining directly to
a thing, unlike actions relating directly to property (in rem), which included certain
incorporeal things related to landed property (e.g. rights of way). See THE INSTITUTES OF
JUSTINIAN at IV.6.1; THE INSTITUTES OF GAIus at IV.1-IV4.
Although it may be obvious from their proximity and similar appearance, it is worth

noting that the English word "association" is derived from the Latin "sodetas," which
in turn derives from "sodus." See THE OxFORD DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH ETYMOLOGY
842 (C.T. Onions ed. 1966). The Latin verb soiare means to unite, to share, or to
"associate." See, e.g., THE NEW COLLEGE LATIN & ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed.,

John C. Traupman ed., 1995) (1966). In the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,
the scope of sodetas expanded from being merely a designation of temporally limited
associations for specific purposes to a designation of entire human communities. See
THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH ETYMOLOGY 842 (C.T. Onions ed. 1966).
Thus was born the modern English sense of "society." See id. Otto Gierke's Das
deutsche Genossenschaftsrechtprovocatively connects these cultural developments to the
emergence of the modern concept of the "state," as can be seen from English
translations provided by Frederick William Maitland and Ernest Barker. See NATURAL
LAW AND THE THEORY OF SOCIETY 1500 TO 1800 (Ernest Barker trans. 1950);
POLITICAL THEORIES OF THE MIDDLE AGES (Frederick William Maitland trans. 1913)
(reprints availablefrom The Lawbook Exchange).
39

40

See

THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN at 111.25.4-111.25.5; THE DIGEST, supra note 37, at
17.2.4-17.2.5; THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS at 111.151-111.152. Note that by the Sixth
Century, the associates could agree that the association would endure beyond their
individual lives. See THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN at 111.25.4-111.25.5.
See, e.., THE DIGEST, supra note 37, at 17.2.14.
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common fund had any real existence or legal significance. Thus, for example, if
in the course of business conducted on behalf of the association, an associate
entered into an agreement with someone outside the association, but failed to
fulfill his obligations under the agreement, a legal action would be brought against
him individually, not his associates or the association as a whole. If the legal
action was successful, the associate might bring an action against his other
associates to be reimbursed for his expenses.4' Thus, the entire legal significance
of the sodetas was in the legal ties formed among the contracting associates, not
in the associates' relationships with third parties.42
However, the situation was completely different in the case of Weber's
contemporary Public Mercantile-Association (offene Handelsgesellschaft). In this
case the associates might all be sued together for action taken by one single
associate, or the association itself might be sued under its registered trade43 The associates were solidariy liable for the associations
name (Firma).
obligations, meaning they were each obligated for the entire amount of any
such obligation (regardless of whether they themselves were responsible for
creating it), and could be forced to pay the entire amount if sued on the obligation
(e.g. by a creditor)." This solidary liability was connected with the starkest
difference between the Public Mercantile-Association and the soietas-the former
could acquire legal rights including ownership (Ezgentum) and create obligations
41

42

43

For a concise discussion of the Roman law principles pertaining to sodetas (translated
as "partnership"), see BORKOWSKI, supra note 37, at 291-95.
For Weber's thorough discussion of the soietates' legal implications, see WEBER,
HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN, supra note 10, at 314-15. See also Lutz Kllber's English
translation, supra note 15, at 54.
See 1861 HGB, supra note 32, at 11.111-11.112. For an English translation of the
1900 Commercial Code (which is relatively similar in the relevant passages), see THE
GERMAN COMMERCIAL CODE (1900) §§ 124, 128 (A.F. Schuster trans. 1911)

(hereinafter "1900 English HGB").
44

See 1861 HGB, supra note 32, at 11.112. See also 1900 English HGB, supra note 43, at
( 128 (translating "solidarisch" as "jointly and severally"). The Anglo-American principle
of "joint and several liability" is similar. For a general discussion of Roman, French
and Louisiana solidary liability principles, compared with Anglo-American joint and several
liability, see Harry Cohen, Comment, Sohdary Obkgaions, 25 TuL. L. REv. 217 (1951).
Under the principle of solidarity, if one associate paid the entire amount of an obligation,
he or she could seek recompense from the other associates. See id. at 225-26.
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in its own name, whereas the latter could not.45 In the case of the Public
Mercantile-Association, the "common fund" was the assodationtproperty,separate
and apart from the associates' individual contributions, whereas in the case of
the soietas the common fund was simply the aggregate of the funds of the
contributing associates. 4 6
In Weber's view, the essential differences between the soietas of Roman
law and the Public Mercantile-Association lay in the solidary liability and the
association's separate property, which were present in the case of the latter but
not in the case of the former.4 7 These distinctions were based on differences in
(1) the corresponding rights and obligations of associates vis-i-vis one another
and third parties, and (2) the corresponding rights and obligations of associates
and third parties vis-a-vis the association's common property. Stated even more
simply, the essential differences between the soietas and the Public MercantileAssociation lay in their distinctive property-relations, i.e. the socio-legal ties
among associates, third parties, and the association's property. However, Weber
was willing to simplify this even further, by defining property itself in sociorelational terms:
"Insofar as one now intends to call "property" a complex of
rights, which all serve a particular purpose, which are uniformly
regulated in a particular organized form, and upon which rest
particular encumbrances and the authoritativeness of this
definition is subject to no reasonable doubt then the entirety of
the legal relations previously described approaches this character."48
Thus one may characterize the differences between forms of organization
in terms of distinctive property-relations, which themselves may be viewed as
45

46

See 1861 HGB, supra note 32, at 11.111. See also 1900 English HGB, supra note 43, at
§ 124.
For Weber's much more thorough discussion of these differences, see WEBER,

supra note 10, at 315-17.
translation, supra note 10, at 55-6.
HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN,

47

WEBER, HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN, supra note

48

Id. at 317.

38

See also Lutz Kalber's English

10, at 318.
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distinctive complexes of rights and obligations among associates and third parties,
all with reference to a particular object (in this case, the common fund).
Where there is an object of property, a natural linguistic association
embedded with enormous power into Roman law (as well as philosophy) by
medieval scholars causes one to look for a subject. To put this in somewhat
contemporary 2 1st Century terms, if there is a thing over which rights can be
exercised; there must be an entity (a "Subject") capable of exercising those
rights. In terms of legal doctrine, this raises the question of "legal personality,"
which is essentially a question of whether the law recognizes an entity as capable
of bearing rights and obligations.4 9 As a matter of formal legal doctrine, the
Public Mercantile-Association of Weber's day was not considered to be a legal
person; this remains true today."o However, Weber was interested in an earlier
period, before the joint-stock corporations presaging the modern business
corporation (today's proto-typical legal person) had emerged."
In fact, Weber was interested in the medieval emergence of the idea of
'personali," as applied to mercantile associations.52 Although the notion of corporate

(legal) personality itself was relatively old, even under Roman law, it had been
most clearly conceived as applying to entities that 21st Century minds would
tend to imbue with a public or semi-public character: cities and towns (civitates,
municipia), colonies (colonia), priestly bodies (sodalitates), and guild-like craftworker clubs that provided meals and funding for certain needs, particularly
funerary needs (collegia).53 Following the rise of Christianity, the notion of
49

50

51

For a thorough discussion of legal personality, its conceptual emergence and its
extension to various corporate entities (including cities) under Roman law, see PW
DUFF, PERSONALITY IN ROMAN PRIVATE LAw (Rothman Reprints 1971) (1938). For
an excellent discussion of the Anglo-American corporation's institutional history,
focused in part on the emergence of legal personality, see Samuel Williston, History of
the Law of Business CorporationsBefore 1800, 2 HARv. L. REv. 105, 149 (1888).
See FOSTER & SULE, supra note 33, at 492-93, 495. Nevertheless, the contemporary law
recognizes that the association's ability to acquire property and otherwise do business
under its trade-name (Firma)does confer a kind of partial legal personality. See id.
See generally WILLISTON, supra note 49. See also SCHMITTHOF, supra note 33.

52

See

53

See generaly DUFF, supra note 49.

WEBER, HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN,

supra note 10, at 317-18.
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corporate personality was extended to the Church, as well as to certain other
charitable and monastic organizations.5 4 However, except with respect to
associations of tax-collectors (societates publicanorum/ectigalium), corporate
personality never appears to have been broadly extended to the societates by
Roman jurists, nor to specifically commercial enterprises, although limited,
exceptional cases may be ambiguously identifiable."
In all of the cases where corporate personality was deemed to extend to
organizations, the endowment of this corporate personality was primarily
significant in its implications for property-relations, for an entity with legal
personality was an entity with the capacity to acquire distinct rights and
obligations vis-i-vis property in its own name.5 6 For Weber, then, the emergence
of mercantile associations' quasi-personality paralleled the emergence of their
distinctive property-relations.17 And based on his review of the south-European
sources, he believed this emergence began with a simple mental and verbal
"short-hand" method (eine Art praktischer Breviloquenf) of referring to these
distinctive property-relations under the trade-name (Firma)of the association.58
Thus, even if the mercantile associations never acquired legal personality as a
matter of formal doctrine, they acquired it as a matter of customary development,
which in turn emerged out of a cultural (ideational and linguistic) development.5 '
Based on his review of late-Roman (Sixth Century A.D.) legal sources,
Weber saw no evidence of a shift toward the distinctive property-relations (i.e.
solidary liability, separate associational property) and corollary quasi-corporate
personality that characterized the Public Mercantile-Association of his own
day.6 o Thus, the answer to his initial binary query whether medieval south54
5

56

See id. at 168-203.
See id. at 141-51, 159-61. As Weber noted, the Roman-law category of sodetas applied
broadly to include associations with multiple purposes; associations with commercial
purposes were only one large subset of sodetates. See WEBER, HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN,
supra note 10, at 314. See also THE DIGEST, supra note 37, at 17.2; BORKOWSKI, supra
note 37, at 291.
See generally DUFF, supra note 49.

5

See WEBER, HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN, supra note 10, at 317-18.

5

See id.

9
60

See id.
See id. at 319-21.
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European mercantile customs resulted in completely new legal concepts, through
general acceptance and development into customary law, or whether such
customs were met by transformed, but previously existent, legal institutions
was negative for the latter, and therefore positive for the former.'
To put his investigation into contemporary social-scientific terms, Weber
was using late-Roman legal sources to perform something analogous to a
narrowly-specified cultural investigation, attempting to locate within legal texts
evidence of an ideational shift toward viewing the soietates as quasi-corporate
entities, viewing the common fund as the soietas' separate property, or viewing
the associates as solidariky liable.62 Seeing no evidence of this ideational shift in

the legal texts, Weber concluded that it cannot have taken place through gradual
modification of established late-Roman legal institutions, but must instead have
emerged independently out of mercantile custom. 63 The remainder of The History
of MercantileAssoaations, including the entirety of the Dissertation, was focused
on identifying the precise origins and causes of this ideational (i.e. cultural) and
customary shift.
Why was Weber able to answer this question so definitely simply from an
analysis of (a very few) Sixth-Century Byzantine legal sources,64 and then to make
what appears to be a radical shift to south-European medieval sources? In order
to understand why Weber believed such conclusions were defensible it is necessary
to briefly examine early-medieval European socio-legal developments.
It is generally agreed that, during the period of "Late Antiquity" (depending
upon how one classifies, roughly the third through seventh centuries A.D.),
61
62

63
64

See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
The idea that legal doctrine can be a topic of study for ethnographers, and that legal
texts can serve as sources in such studies, has been recently defended by anthropologists
and science studies scholars. See Annelise Riles, Property as Legal Knowedge: Means and
Ends, 10 J. Roy. ANTHROP. INST. 775, 777-78, 791n.2 (2004). See also Mark Suchman,
The Contract as SodalArtifaa, 37 LAW AND Soc'y REv. 91 (2003).
See WEBER, HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN, supra note 10, at 319-21.
All Weber's sources were from The Digest (Constantinople, 533 A.D.) except for the
statute (lex) of the Roman (Latin) colony of Malaca, site of present-day Milaga,
Spain. See id. at 320. See also, supra note 37.
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transformations of broad-ranging social significance occurred throughout areas
that had been administered under Roman power.65 On the European continent,
these transformations manifested themselves, among other ways, in altered
socio-legal structures and institutions. As Germanic "barbarians" exercised
increasing administrative power, they tended to narrow the application of
Roman law to Roman citizens, while permitting native law to be applied to
Germanic peoples. These peoples had gained literacy through their encounter
with Roman culture, but had originally maintained an oral culture; thus their
native law was oral and customary, rather than written. In narrowing the
application of written Roman law and in occasionally committing native
"Germanic" law to writing, the Germanic administrators, whether they
intended to or not, brought about the demise of Roman law. Even the Emperor
Justinian's magnificent Roman law codification of the Sixth Century (the Code
of Justinian),'66 to which Weber refers, had a very minimal European impact at
the time of its promulgation. For Europe, the social force of that Code would
be held in check for another six centuries.
Because the period of "Roman law" is viewed by legal scholars as
ending gloriously with Justinian's Sixth-Century Code, Weber was able to
treat the lack of evidence in that Code as decisive for Roman law. Having
failed to find evidence of the ideational shift in perspective (regarding the
sodietates) that he was looking for in the Code, he was able to conclude that
it never occurred in Roman law. Because historically the shift away from
written Roman law meant a shift toward unwritten customary law with brief
interludes of written law amalgamating Roman and Germanic elements
emergent from custom, a conclusion that the ideational shift didn't manifest
itself in written Roman law was tantamount to a conclusion that it must
65

This paragraph represents a distillation of what the author believes to be current
scholarly consensus. Exemplary sources for the author's beliefs include RANDALL
A CULTURAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE (2009);
PETER STEIN, ROMAN LAW IN EUROPEAN HISTORY (1999); MANLIO BELLOMO, THE
COMMON LEGAL PAST OF EUROPE (1995); R.C. VAN CAENEGEM, AN HISTORICAL
INTRODUCTION TO PRIVATE LAW (1988); WIEACKER, supra note 9.
See THE DIGEST, supra note 37; THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN, supra note 37.
LESAFFER, EUROPEAN LEGAL HISTORY:
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have occurred through custom. Weber did not rely on this argument,
however. Instead, he turned to the available sources in order to find empirical
evidence of shifting south-European mercantile customs. These sources
were the written south-European laws and mercantile documents (primarily
contracts, which were typically prepared by trained notaries) of Late
Antiquity and the subsequent "Middle Ages."
Based on his examination of these materials, Weber concluded that the
south-European property-relations characteristic of the associational "firm" (the
analog to the Public Mercantile-Association of his day) emerged out of the
"household" (Haushalt)and "craft-industry" (Handwerk, Gewerbe) productive
communities (Gemeinschaften, Genossen), rather than the medieval maritime
successors to the Roman sodetates-the commenda, the societatesmans, and the sodietates

terrae.6" Within the ancient Mediterranean and Mesopotamian world, the
household and the craft-industry "guilds" were fundamentally-important socioeconomic institutions." For Weber, the characteristic property-relations of these
productive communities were necessarily those which could give rise to the
property-relations characteristic of the Public Mercantile-Association:
associational (i.e. communal, joint) property and solitary liability."9 It was precisely
this conclusion that Weber's Dissertation defended, and that constituted the
heart of his History of Mercantile-Associations.

67

See

WEBER, HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN, supra note 10, at 323-86; Kalber's English

translation, supra note 15, at 63-125.
68

See A. LEO OPPENHEIM, ANCIENT MESOPOTAMIA 75-83 (rev'd ed. 1977) (1964); ALISON
BURFORD, CRAFTSMEN IN GREEK AND ROMAN SOCIETY 159-64 (1972); DUFF, supra

note 49, at 103 et seq. Reflecting this potent institutional history, it is the Greek word
for household (oikos) from whence the English "economics" derives. See THE OXFORD
See also Richard
Swedberg, The Economy as a MaterialHousehold: Economic Theorizing From Xenophon to
Home Economics and Beyond, in TREVOR PINCH & RICHARD SWEDBERG (EDS.) LIVING IN
DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH ETYMOLOGY 300 (C.T. Onions ed. 1966).

69

A MATERIAL WORLD: ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY MEETS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
STUDIES (2008); M.I. FINLEY, THE ANCIENT ECONOMY (updated ed. 1999) (1973);
Scorr MEIKLE, ARISTOTLE'S ECONoMIC THOUGHT (1995).
See WEBER, HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN, supra note 10, at 344-86; Kilber's English

translation, supra note 15, at 85-125.
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B. The Answer: Medieval Household and Guild Property-Relational
Structures, as Interpretedby Jurists
In Weber's view, the physical and legal limitations placed on inheritance by
sons of a father's estate, particularly his real property (primarily land and
buildings), must necessarily have resulted in some form of communal property.70
Whenever a male head-of-household (Latin paterfamilias, German Familienvater,
Hausater)died leaving more than one male heir, the question to be decided was
whether the family estate would be divided between the heirs or whether the
sons and their families would remain together as part of the household without
dividing it. In the case of real property, unless additional land was acquired,
division over the course of several generations naturally reduced the property
to small plots. At some point those plots would become too small to sustain
even a single family. Because land was expensive and difficult to acquire, and
because it was often impossible to expand city property due to enclosure by
walls, male heirs would often choose to remain, together with their families, as
part of the father's household. Such households, then, might include several
generations of male heirs, their wives and children, and their domestic servants.
The household property, rather than being divided among the males, was
controlled by the Hausvater for the benefit of the household.
This property-relational structure, with a male head-of-household
regarded as the sole "owner" of household property, with obligations to administer
that property for the benefit of all extended-household members, is ancient and
archetypal, at least in Indo-European cultures. It is broadly attested in both
Greek and Roman law, and its residue remained through Weber's time into our
own. However, by the middle ages certain limits to this absolute father-power
were developing: male heirs were empowered both to use and to encumber the
household property in unlimited amounts.72 On the other hand, any property
70

71
72

See

supra note 10, at 344-47; Kalber's English
translation, supra note 15, at 85-8.
See infra notes 154-158 and accompanying text.
See WEBER, HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN, supra note 10, at 345-46; Kalber's English
translation, supra note 15, at 86-7.
WEBER, HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN,
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that they acquired became part of the household property." Thus, as an internal
matter of the household, all property was regarded as common, administered
primarily by the Hausater,but to an increasing degree by the sons and brothers
as well.74
In the eyes of the legal theorists, the household was a productive community
in which the results of productive labor were shared.
In a somewhat
euphemistic phraseology, from whence we see the origins of the Anglo-French
"company," the household members were said to stand as one with respect to
the bread and wine (stare ad unum panem et vinum).7'6 This cultural and juristic
perspective was not limited to the household, however, but also extended to
the craft-industry guilds, which produced the goods that enriched so many
medieval cities.77 The common perspective was possible because the medieval
jurists didn't view actual kinship as an essential element in constituting a
household community; in fact, as has already been mentioned, such households
included many non-kin, such as wives and servants.7 ' Thus, because the propertyrelations among craft-workers were essentially the same as those of members
within a household, the jurists regarded them as constituting the same basic
type of productive community.79
With respect to property-relations within these productive communities,
the essential change occurred when individual members came to be regarded as
having an individual "share" in the common property.s This occurred for
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See id.
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See WEBER, HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN, supra note 10, at 345-49;

Kilber's English

translation, supra note 15, at 86-9.
7

See WEBER, HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN, supra note 10, at 347-49; Kilber's English
translation, supra notel5, at 88-9.
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See id.
See WEBER,
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HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN, supra note 10, at 351-52; Kilber's English
translation, supra note 15 at 91-93.
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See id.
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See id.
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See WEBER, HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN, supra note 10, at 346-51; Kaiber's English

translation, supra note 15, at 87-91.
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households because of a few limited cases in which family members, including
daughters, were viewed as having property that either never became part of the
household, or as individually due a portion of the household's property."'
Although these were very limited exceptions to the basic principle of common
property, their existence necessitated an accounting for the household property
in terms of individual accounts or "shares." 8 2 As soon as individual accounts
were created for the household's property, Weber argued, the tendency to view
acquired property and debts as individual rather than communal became much
greater.83 The extent to which this tendency was followed differed between
northern and southern Italy, according to Weber, and it was the limitation of
this tendency, the maintenance of strong communal property principles, that
facilitated the development of the "firm" in the Lombard north.84 This limitation
was necessary in order to enable the concept of "associational property," which
was one essential element of the Public Mercantile-Association.
The other essential element of the Public Mercantile-Association, solidary
iabiliy, also emerged out of the household, according to Weber, as a result of
its primordial links to kinship liability." Such kinship liability systems have
recurrently formed the precursors to formal legal systems, and stories of their
brutality are used by legal theorists to evidence the need for established legal
systems. Over time, limitations on this collective responsibility for wrongs (delicts)
committed by family-members came to be imposed, but with the growth of
household commercial activity the concept was nevertheless extended to include
an analogous situation: the collective responsibility to pay a creditor harmed by
a debtor's inability to pay his debt." Thus, although the legal system eliminated
many aspects of familial "joint liability" in the interests of public stability, the

81
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See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See WEBER, HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN, supra note 10, at 356-57; Kalber's English

translation, supra note 15, at 96-7.
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See id.
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residue that remained became particularized to commercial matters, forming
the core of a productive community's "soidary iability.""
The power of this solidary liability lay in its ability to meld a productive
community of property into apersonalcommunity:to satisfy an associate's unpaid
debt, a creditor could either take action against the associational property
(an in rem proceeding) or he could take action against the associates
personally, demanding that they satisfy the obligation from whatever property
they might happen to possess, some of which might be deemed separate
and apart from the association's common property (an in personam
proceeding)." This enabled associations to operate on the basis of increasing
amounts of debt, and thereby permitted the scale of household and guild
commerce to increase dramatically, since creditors were given greater security
for their loans, in the form of personal guarantees on top of the common
associational property that could be seized."
On the other hand, as the commercial scale of business activity expanded,
and as workshops and factories became increasingly separated from domestic
household activities, such unlimited soliday liability was increasingly perceived
as unjust in cases where the liability arose out of activities unrelated to the
common commercial purposes.90 So over time the city statutes regulating
household and guild activities tended to limit solidary liability to obligations
undertaken in relation to those common business purposes.9' In order to clearly
differentiate obligations undertaken on behalf of the business from those
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88

89
90

See WEBER, HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN, supra note 10, at 356-74; Kilber's English
translation, supra note 15, at 96-113.
See WEBER, HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN, supra note 10, at 357-74; Kilber's English
translation, supra note 15, at 98-113.

See id.
See WEBER,

HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN, supra note 10, at 373-81; Kilber's English

translation, supra note 15, at 113-21.
91

See id.

92

See WEBER,

HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN, supra note 10, at 381-83; Kilber's English

translation, supra note 15, at 121-23.
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undertaken for other, more personal purposes, associates entered into obligations
9 2 Hence arose
under the trade-name of the commercial enterprise, the Firma.
that "short-hand" method (die Art praktischer Breviloquenf) of referring to the

association's property-relations under the name of the "firm," which Weber
viewed as the customary origin of corporate personality.93
In Weber's view, these south-European medieval processes resulted in the
creation of two associational "types," characterized by their distinctive propertyrelations.94 The first, which corresponded to the Commenda-associationof his
day, emerged directly out of the Roman sodietas and manifested itself in the
medieval south-European commenda, soietates mans, and soietates terrae.s The

second, in which he was primarily interested, corresponded to the Public
Mercantile-Association of his day.
Extrapolating slightly, it would seem that the development of this second
type was more interesting to Weber because its development was more complex
and had greater significance for modern capitalism, being in many ways the
precursor to the modern business corporation. What emerges most clearly from
Weber's text, however, is his deep interest in the complex interaction among (1)
mercantile custom and material reality, (2) legal practice and regulation and (3)
juristic philosophy (jurisprudence). 6 The picture that Weber paints is one in
which these three forces operated together, to a certain extent according to
their own independent logics but also in constant interactional tension, shaping
certain ideational and cultural developments that were critical to the emergence
of the modern business organization, or "firm."
93

See id.; see also, supra note 38 and accompanying text. Striking manifestations of this
"short-hand" method, as picked up by U.S. jurists, can be seen in several early
Pennsylvania decisions compiled, together with the first United States Supreme Court
opinions, by A.J. Dallas. See, e.g., Tilhier v. Whitehead, 1 U.S. (Dallas) 269 (Penn.
1788); Musgrove v. Gibbs, 1 U.S. (Dallas) 216 (Penn. 1787).

94

See WEBER, HANDELSGESELLSCHAFFEN,

95
96

supranote, at 427; Klber's English translation,
supra note 15, at 169.
See WEBER, HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN, supra note 10, at 323-44, 386-428; Kalber's
English translation, supra note 15, at 63-83, 127-71.
See especialy WEBER, HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN, supra note 10, at 321-22, 383-86,
427-40; Kalber's English translation, supra note 15 at 60-61, 123-25, 169-81.
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In Weber's view, the complexity of interaction between commercial law
and economic reality was demonstrated by the fact that the Public MercantileAssociation did not develop out of the entities that first continued the provision
of commercial goods and services following the demise of the Western Roman
Empire: the medieval societates and commenda. Rather, the Public MercantileAssociation's defining property-relations developed from areas of the economy
that were seemingly quite distant from mercantile exchange: the household
community and craft-industry guild. As these productive communities
increasingly engaged in large-scale commercial activity and mercantile exchange,
the medieval jurists trained in Roman law struggled to incorporate them into a
system that formally had no place for them. In the end, they placed their reliance
on the very thing that the associational members relied on to delineate their
solidary personal liability: operation under the "firm's" trade name.17 In such
cases the jurists were able to analogize the commercial associations to the (nonmercantile) corporations known to Roman law, and to determine the implications
of their activities according to established jurisprudential principles. By bringing
corporate personality and its characteristic property-relations together with
mercantile and commercial activity, the medieval jurists laid the jurisprudential
foundations necessary to legally conceptualize commercial corporations, which
would become so vital to modem capitalism.

C. Significance of Weber's Dissertation for a Sociological Theory of
Property
In investigating the origins of modern, commercial associational forms
(Gesellschaften), and in attributing those origins to medieval communal forms
(Gemeinschaften), Weber articulated his own version of the transition from
community to contractual association that became archetypal for early sociology
through the work of Ferdinand Tonnies," and that continues to resonate in

97
98

See WEBER, HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN, supra note 10, at 427-40; Kalber's English
translation, supra note 15, at 169-80.
COMMUNITY AND CivIL SOCIETY (2001, Jose Harris ed.) (first published in 1887 as
Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft).
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contemporary sociology." That he did so by means of a sophisticated legal and
cultural analysis, investigating an original hypothesis concerning precursors to
modern capitalism's preeminent corporate organizational form, testifies to
Weber's scholarly personality.
With respect to the subject of property, Weber's Dissertation is significant
for a number of reasons. To begin with, it is striking that Weber's first published
definition of property was stated in terms that so strongly echo the "bundle of
rights" definitions in vogue today.'o Such definitions, as can be clearly seen in
the contemporary work of the economist Yoram Barzel, often point to a
relationship of dependency between property "rights" and the organizational
structure of social relationships.'o' This was certainly true for Weber's treatment,
which was historically and legally sophisticated in its analysis of the
interdependence between property and organized social relationships. This theme
was one to which Weber would repeatedly return, and it formed part of his
continued project to explore the role of law in economy and society.'02
Furthermore, Weber's utilization of primary legal texts in an effort to identify
the source(s) of an "ideational" (cultural) shift toward viewing the firm as a
separate legal entity with property-related rights and obligations is
methodologically interesting, resonating with emerging themes in socio-legal

See, e.g., Bruce Keith & Morton G. Ender, The Sociological Core: Conceptual Patternsand
Idiosyncrasies in the Structure and Content of Introductory Sociology Textbooks, 1940-2000,
32 TEACHING SOCIOLOGY 19, 27 (2004); Steven Brint, Gemeinschaft Revisited: A Critique
and Reconstruction of the Community Concept, 19 SOCIOLOGIcAL THEORY 1 (2001); Michael
Hechter and Satoshi Kanazawa, Sociological Rational Choice Theory, 23 ANNUAL REV.
Soc. 191, 196 (1997). As these journals and titles partially indicate, references to
these concepts cross a wide spectrum in sociology, from rational choice theory to
sociology of religion and communications research in the tradition of Robert K.
Merton and Paul Lazarsfeld.
100 See supra note 48 and accompanying text. For a contemporary statement of the
"bundle of rights" definition, see e.g., GRANT S. NELSON ET AL., CONTEMPORARY
PROPERTY 5 (2d ed. 2002).
101 See generally, BARZEL, supra note 2.
102
See infra, particularly Section IV
99
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and cultural studies.' 03

In using primary legal texts to identify the sources of

cultural change, and in briefly exploring the role of classically-trained "jurists"
in formulating (through analogy to classical Roman law forms) a legal doctrine
for application to emerging corporate entities, Weber indicated a process
according to which legal concepts can play a causal role in social and cultural
change. This early formulation would receive much deeper treatment in Weber's
"sociology of law."' 04

II. THE ECONOMIC-HISTORICAL PHASE:

GREAT TRANSFORMATION

FROM AGRARIAN TO COMMERCIAL

PROPERTY-RELATIONS

A. Agrarian Property-Relations in Antiquity: The Habilitation
Building to a certain extent off his Dissertation, Weber's Habilitation
established a trajectory for his future career and a large portion of his substantive
scholarly work through its focus on agrarian property-relations, particularly
ownership (Eigentum) and possession (Besit) of land. This second dissertation,
published in Fall 1891, was tided "Roman Agrarian History in its Significance
for Public and Private Law".' It was dedicated to the "Herr Privy-Counselor"
August Meitzen,'06 a statesman whose scholarly contributions to statistical "statescience" (Staatswissenschafl)and agrarian history had earned him an "extraordinary"
appointment to University of Berlin's Faculty of Philosophy.o' Although Roman
103

See RILES, supra note 62; SUCHMAN, supra note 62; see also, ANNE NORTON, REPUBLIC
OF SIGNS 123-38 (1993).

104
105

See infra note 304 and accompanying text.
See MAX WEBER, DIE ROMISCHE AGRARGESCHICHTE

IN WIRER BEDEUTUNG FUR DAS STAATS-

UND PRIVATRECHT (1891), as republished in MAX WEBER GESAMTAUSGABE 1/2 (Jiirgen

Deininger ed. 1986) (hereinafter "Die Romische Agrargeschichte"). This work was only
recently translated into English by Richard I. Frank. See RoMAN AGRARIAN HISTORY IN
rrs RELATION To RoMAN PUBLIC AND CIVIL LAw (Richard I. Frank trans. 2008).
106

10

See WEBER, DIE ROMISCHE AGRARGESCHICHTE, supra note 105, at 92. See also, supra
note 13 and infra note 107.
University of Berlin had been instituted upon the explicitly-formulated ideology that

every individual discipline, all specialized knowledge, must be connected to the
foundational discipline: philosophy, the "general knowledge." See WIEACKER,
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public/administrative and private law figured prominently as source-material
for the Habilitation, Weber directed primary focus on the writings of the Roman
land-surveyors (agrimensores),oswhich in 1848-1852 had been edited and published
by Karl Lachmann, Friedrich Blime and A. Rudorff as Die Schrften der rimischen
Feldmesser.o' While on the one hand the Habilitation served alongside Weber's
Dissertation to qualify him as a jurisprudential lecturer in "Commercial and Roman
(Public and Private) Law,""o it also marked a shift in Weber's academic scholarship
toward a focus on economics and public administration, which would be manifested
in his professional appointments as well as numerous scholarly works."'
The Habilitation started from a simple but fundamental question: what
caused Rome to be transformed from a Mediterranean-based city-state, analogous
supra note 9, at 279 n.2, 293. This ideology manifested itself alongside emergent

German nationalism in the organizational structure of the University, which divided
the faculty into four basic categories: law, medicine, theology and philosophy. See
Leo S. Rowe, Instruction in Public Law and PoliticalEconomy in German Universities, 1 ANN.
AMERICAN AcAD. OF POL. & Soc. Sci. 78, 79 (1890). All specialized knowledge not
falling within the categories of law, medicine or theology was classified as "philosophy,"

including economics and statistics. See id. Because his scholarly and professional

108

109

110

work pertained to statistical science and "national-economy" (National-Okonomie),
Meitzen was classified as a professor within the Faculty of Philosophy. See id. at 84.
As an "extraordinary" professor, he was not allowed to vote alongside his "ordinary"
colleagues and probably received a lower salary. See id. at 79.
See WEBER, DIE ROMISCHE AGRARGESCHICHTE, supra note 105, at 105-6. See also
Jiirgen Deininger, Editorischer Bericht, in WEBER, DIE ROMIsCHE AGRARGESCHICHTE,
supra note 105, at 81-2.

See BRIAN

CAMPBELL, THE WRITINGS OF THE ROMAN LAND SURVEYORS: INTRODUCTION,
TEXT, TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY xii, xxii (Journal of Roman Studies Monograph
No. 9) (2000). Weber also relied extensively on the aristocratic Roman agrarian

authors, particularly Cato, Varro and Columella, as well as Cicero and other primary
Roman sources. See generaly WEBER, DIE ROMISCHE AGRARGESCHICHTE, supra note,
and particularly the Quellenregister and Personenregister, at 400-18.
See Jiirgen Deininger, EditorischerBericht, in WEBER, DIE ROMISCHE AGRARGESCHICHTE,
supra note 105, at 64-7; Kasler, supra note 14, at 7-8. Weber is often described
(including by his wife Marianne) as qualifying in both Roman and German law (in
addition to commercial law) but this is incorrect - formally, he was never "habilitated"
in German law. See Jirgen Deininger, EditorischerBericht, in WEBER, DIE ROMISCHE
AGRARGESCHICHTE, supra note 105, at 65 n.5 C MARIANNE WEBER, MAX WEBER: A
BIOGRAPHY 115 (Harry Zohn trans. & ed., Transaction Publishers ed. 1988) (1975).
See generally Kasler, supra note 14.
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in many respects to contemporaneous Greek poleis and Phoenician city-states,
into a continental empire built on territorial conquest?112 Starting from a position
close to that of "methodological individualism,"" 3 Weber posited the further
question: was this transitional-development an intended (bewuft) outcome,
achieved as a result of the power and ambition of particular social strata and
economic interest-groups?" 4 If the intentional wielding of socio-economic power
did lie at the heart of Rome's transformation, what was the object toward which
this socio-economic power was directed, or in slightly different words, what
objective motivated the wielding of this socio-economic power? Weber's answer
to this question was as follows: the ultimate object over which social conflict
took place (das eigentliche Kampfobjec) was that which was the "prize of (military)
victory" (der Preis des Siegers): the land of the Roman people, the "public land"
(agerpublicus)."5
The distinction between public and private things (res publicae, res privatae)
- along with a complementary third category, that of sacred things (res sacrorum)
- appears to have been fundamental in its cultural significance to the Roman
people, and particularly to Roman lawyers.'1 6 Evidence for the distinction appears

112

See

WEBER, DIE ROMISCHE AGRARGESCHICHTE,

supra note 105, at 101-2. See also MAx

WEBER, AGRARVERHALTNISSE IM ALTERTUM, originallypublished in Handworterbuch der

Staatswissenschaften (1909), and republished by Marianne Weber in MAX WEBER,

GESAMMELTE

AUFSATZE ZUR SOZIAL-UND-WIRTSCHAFTSGESCHICHTE

190-91, 218-19

(1924) (hereinafter "AGRARVERHALTNISSE"); for an English translation, see THE AGRARIAN
SOCIOLOGY OF ANCIENT CIVILIZATIONS (R. I. Frank trans., Verso edition, 1988) (NLB
113

edition 1976).
Weber explicitly embraced a position of methodological individualism (i.e. the
methodological position that the basic unit of sociological explanation must be the
individual person, rather than collective social entities, e.g. nation-states) in Economy
and Sociey. See WEBER, supra note 8, at 13-19; see also SWEDBERG, supra note 8, at 23,
163-64 (1998).
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See

115

See id. at 102.

116

Note that the word "republic" derives from respublica, the public thing (or property).
See CICERO, THE REPUBLIC I.XXV. The English word "commonwealth" captures this
conception very nicely.

WEBER, DIE ROMISCHE AGRARGESCHICHTE, supra note 105, at 101-2.
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in the oldest written Roman laws, The Twelve Tables,"' which were drafted circa
451-450 B.C."' Over the course of the Republican period (c. 510-27 B.C.) the
distinction was formalized, so that by the time of Gaius' Institutes (c. 160-79
A.D.) it was possible for a Roman jurist to state definitively that:
things which are under human law [i.e. not governed by divine
law] are either public or private. Public things are regarded as
no one's property, for they are thought of as belonging to the
whole body of the people [the universitas]. Private things are
those belonging to individuals."9
This distinction was applied to all things, across the categorical division
between things with a physical embodiment (res corporales) - things capable of
being touched - and things without a physical embodiment (res incorporales),
which cannot be touched.120
The corporeal (tangible) thing that was arguably preeminent in both cultural
and economic significance to the Romans, as well as so many of their
Mediterranean contemporaries, was land (ager).121 In the agriculturally-based
communities of the ancient Mediterranean world, possession of land was vital

117

See Table VII, as compiled, translatedand published in

ROMAN CIVILIZATION: SELECTED

READINGS, THE REPUBLIC AND THE AUGUSTAN AGE 112 (Vol. I) (Naphtali Lewis &

118

119

120

121

Meyer Reinhold eds., 3d ed., 1990) (hereinafter "RomAN CIIZATION: SELECTED
READINGs"). For a Latin text, see Fontes Iutis Romani Antiqui I (Georg Bruns &
Otto Gradenwitz eds. 1909), available at http://www.fh-augsburg.de/-harsch/
a chron.html. See also, THE DIGEST, supra note 37, at 43.8.5.
See BORKOWSKI, supra note 37, at 28-30. As late as the time of Cicero, Roman boys
were required to memorize the Twelve Tables. See CICERO, THE LAws II.xxiii.59.
THE INSTITUTES OF GAIuS, supra note 37, at 11.10- 11; see also, THE DIGEST, supra note
, at 1.8; 43.1.1 (Ulpian).
See THE INSTITUTES OF GAIus, supra note 37, at 11.12-14. In contemporary AngloAmerican property law, a parallel distinction is drawn between "tangible" and
"intangible" things. See, e.g., NELSON ET AL., supra note 100, at 5.
See J.A. CROOK, LAW AND LIFE OF ROME 147 (Cornell Paperbacks ed. 1984) (1967);
STUDIES IN RoMAN PROPERTY (M.I. Finley ed. 1976); M. ROSTOVTZEFF, THE SOCIAL
& ECONoMIC HISTORY OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 1-21 (1926).
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to basic survival.'22 Moreover, wealth tended to be conceptualized in terms of
land and agricultural improvements, particularly horses and cattle.'23 In order
to obtain loans for acquisition of land and its continued improvement, the
poorest members of ancient society were often forced to offer their own bodies
to secure the loans, with the result that debt-slavery was common.'2 4 As a
result, the archetypal lawgiver, in the Greek and Roman conception at least,
was the man who could resolve repeated and bitter conflicts over the distribution
of land through allotment procedures.'2 5
According to Cicero, expansion of Roman land through a combination of
treaties and military conquests began at Rome's inception, initiated by the legendary
founder Romulus sometime in the 8' Century B.C.'2 6 Cicero attributed to Romulus'
successor, Numa Pompilus (late 8' to early 7' Century B.C.), the first division
and allocation among Roman citizens of land acquired in this manner. 2 7 Although
this record is the stuff of legend rather than historical fact, having been articulated
long afterward by Roman authors,' 28 it provides tantalizing hints at the origin of a
practice that seems to have been formalized as early as the 4' Century B.C.:
treating land acquired through military expansion as "public land" (agerpubicus),
that is, as land belonging to the populus Romanus collectively as a universitas.'29

122

See

MARY

T. BOATWRIGHT

ET AL., THE ROMANS FROM VILLAGE TO EMPIRE 23-5

SARAH POMEROY ET AL., ANCIENT GREECE:
123

124

A

(2004);

POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL

HISTORY 1-9, 283-85 (1999).
See e.g. CICERO, THE REPUBLIC II.IX; THE POLITEIA (CONSTITUTION) OF ATHENS 3.

It
is generally accepted that the English word "capital" is derived from the Latin noun
caput ("head") and its related root capit-. See THE OxFoRD DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH
ETYMOLOGY 143 (C.T. Onions, ed. 1966). See also WILL DURANT, OUR ORIENTAL
HERITAGE 16 (The Easton Press 1992) (1935). ("The Romans used kindred words pecus and pecunia - for cattle and money, and placed an image of an ox upon their
early coins. Our own words capital, chattel and cattle go back through the French to
the Latin capitale, meaning property: and this in turn derives from caput, meaning
head - i.e., of cattle.")
See THE POLITEIA (CONSTITUTION) OF ATHENS 2 (describing the unhappy situation of
impoverished Athenians prior to the time of Draco and Solon). For an image of the
ancient Roman situation, see THE TWELVE TABLES, TABLE III (describing the procedures
for dealing with debts owed, which included sale into slavery across the Tiber River
and an optional "cutting into parts" by the creditors, which may refer either to the
debtor's body or his possessions).
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Colonist-farmers (coloni) were sent out to settle on the land in colonies
(colonia), having been granted legally-protected possession by the populus Romanus,
which during the republican period was embodied in the Senate. 30 In certain
limited cases, the conquered land might pass into private ownership (dominium),
either because it was purchased from the populus Romanus by an individual, or
because it was allocated directly to an individual, a process sometimes referred
to as "viritane assignment".13' However, the vast majority of land acquired by
conquest was regarded as belonging to the populus Romanus: "viritane
assignments" were politically controversial, and the establishment of individual
ownership through purchase apparently occurred infrequently.132

125

126

127
128
129

130

131

132

See THE

POLITEIA (CONSTITUTION) OF ATHENS

(describing Solon's lawgiving efforts in

establishing the "constitution" of Athens); CICERO, THE REPUBLIC II.XIV (describing
Numa's division of the land won by Romulus in conquest); PLUTARCH, PARALLEL
LIVES (Lycurgus, lawgiver of Sparta and Numa Pompilus, lawgiver of Rome). See
also PLATO, THE LAWS BOOK V; GLENN R. MORROW, PLATO'S CRETAN CITY 95-152
(1993 Edition) (1960) (placing Plato's elaborate land-allotment scheme in The Laws in
historical and cultural context).
THE REPUBLIC II.I - II.XIV The dating of Romulus' life to the th Century B.C.
8
(753-715) is attributable to Marcus Terentius Varro (116-27 B.C.). See BOATWRIGHT
ET AL, supra note 122, at 37-40.
THE REPUBLIC II.XIV For Varro's dates, see BOATWRIGHT ET AL, supra note 122, at 37-40.
See BOATWRIGHT ET AL, supra note 122, at 37-40.
See id. at 81-2; ROSTOVTZEFF, supra note 121, at 14-16; SMITH, supra note 119, at 389. See also APPIAN, THE CIVIL WARS 1.7 (Horace White ed.).
See APPIAN, THE CIVIL WARS 1.7 (Horace White ed.); BOATWRIGHT ET Al, supra note
122, at 81-82; SMITH, supra note 119, at 38-9, 315-20.
See Siculus Flaccus, Categories of Land in CAMPBELL, supra note 109 at 120, 127-28;
Livy, HISTORY OF ROME 31.4; POLYBIuS, THE RISE OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 2.21 (Jan
Scott-Kilvert trans., Penguin edition 1979). See also BOATWRIGHT ET AL, supra note
122, at 81; SMITH, supra note 119, at 38-9; P.L. MacKendrick, Roman Colonigation, 6
PHOENIX 139 (1952). In addition, beginning with Octavian, Caesar Augustus (c. 27
B.C.) and extending throughout the remainder of the Empire, portions of conquered
land were considered to pass directly into the private ownership (dominium) of the
emperor. See SMITH, supra note 119, at 38-9.
See Siculus Flaccus, Categories of Land in CAMPBELL, supra note 109 at 119-20;
POLYBIUS, THE RISE OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 2.21 (Jan Scott-Kilvert trans., Penguin
edition 1979) (indicating the controversial nature of "viritane assignment" by labeling
it a "demogogic measure"); SMITH, supra note 119, at 38-9; MAcKENDRICK, supra
note 131, at 145-46.
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Thus the situation that developed over the course of the Roman Republican
period with respect to landed property appears to have been generally as follows.
Outright ownership of land by private individuals had existed at least from the
time of the Twelve Tables (c 450 B.C.), but it was rare, being limited primarily
to ancient wealthy families (the senatorial classes, which at first only included
the patricians and later expanded to include the equites)and the immediate territory
around Rome, with very limited patchwork additions across the wider Italian
peninsula. The vast majority of the land acquired in the course of Rome's
military expansion across the Italian peninsula, North Africa, Spain and southern
Europe was regarded as agerpublicus,"owned" by the populus Romanus, but legally
under the possession of public corporate bodies (municipia, colonia,praefecturae)
as well as private individuals.
In general, legally-protected possession of the agerpublicusimpliedthe legallysanctioned ability to make use of the land and profit from its fruits (usus and
fructus, often referred to together as usufruct).133 It was therefore possible to profit
extensively from the agerpublicus without having legal ownership. The skilled
professionals who enabled this complex system to develop through their detailed
surveys of the land (establishing boundaries and separating public from private
land), their records of land-assignments, and their assistance in resolving disputes
relating to ownership, possession, and tax-obligations pertaining to the land,
were the agnmensores.134
With this background, Weber's inquiry in the Roman AgrarianHistoy comes
into greater focus, and his source-materials take on added significance.
In his introduction, Weber emphasized the "sharp contrast" between a
situation in which persons living on and/or making use of land are merely granted
133

134

See

THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS, supra note 37, at 11.7. Gaius refers only to land in the
provinces, and thus excludes the Italian peninsula. The reason for this is simple: in 111
B.C. a controversial agrarian law had transformed the Italian agerpublicusinto property
under the private ownership of the individuals or corporate bodies who had previously
possessed it. See RoMAN CivizATION: SELECTED READINGS, supra note 117, at 276-83.
See also WEBER, DIE ROMISCHE AGRARGESCHICHTE, supra note 105, at 102-103.
See CAMPBELL, supra note 119, at xxvii-1xi; SMITH, supra note 109, at 37-44.
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a kind of "precarious" possession of public land, and the alternative situation
"bearing the stamp of consciousness and modernity on its forehead": the private,
individual ownership of land and soil (Grundund Boden), which is consequentially
attended by the "individualistic motivations" of free disposition of title by
proprietors, at increasing levels of velocity, or mobility (Beweglichkeit.135
In striking similarity to his Dissertation, Weber was interested in identifying
the source of an \ shift toward a particular property-related conception, in this
36 Moreover, also in striking
case the "ownership-concept" (Eigentumsbegri5.1
similarity to his Dissertation, Weber was interested in locating the economic
ideas (wirtschaftliche Gedanken) emergent from Roman agrarian practice, which
corresponded to this essentially juristic concept of "ownership" (Eigentum).13 7
In seeking to understand the historical processes according to which conceptions
from a particular area of the economy were brought together with concepts
from legal practice and theory, Weber was again seeking to understand the
complex interaction between law and the economy, to which he would return
so often in his later work.
One of Weber's central arguments in his Habilitation was that the legal
changes corresponding to the economic changes he would investigate - the
shift toward a conception of land analogous to the private-ownership-concept
and the growth of an economic industry centered around the profit-oriented
exchange of property-titles (i.e. capitalistic exchange) - were not to be sought
for primarily in Roman private law and freedom of contract, but rather were
located in Roman public and administrative law.'38 The chronological location
135

See WEBER, DIE ROMisCHE AGRARGESCHICHTE, supra note 105, at 102.

136

See id.

137

See id. In posing this question about the "ownership-concept" and noting its dominance
of juristic thought, Weber also paused to recognize the fact that some "admire" its
consequences, while others regard it as "the root of all evil in our real property law."
See id.
See id. at 102-4. In this thesis, the influence of Theodor Mommsen and August
Meitzen is particularly evident. Theodor Mommsen had written and lectured
extensively on Roman public and administrative law, and August Meitzen's entire
career had been devoted to public administration. See JiirgenDeininger,Einleitung,in
WEBER, DIE ROMISCHE AGRARGESCHICHTE, supra note 105, at 15-19, 22-4.
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of these developments, Weber argued, could be delineated by beginning with
the Agrarian Law of 111 B.C., - which followed a period of intense conflict
over land-allocations and transformed vast expanses of the ager publicus into
privately owned land - and focusing particularly on the Roman Republic's final
century, then following the course of developments through to the Imperial
age.' 9 From the soil of that Imperial age would emerge the "manorial dominion
system" (Grundherrschaft)of the early middle ages.'40
Weber began his Habilitation by examining in extensive detail the various
forms of land-measurement utilized by the Roman land-surveyors.141 By
combining these sources with earlier Roman writings and legal sources, Weber
sought to sketch out an historical account of the development of the
measurement-forms described by the land-surveyors.142 Such a task presented
significant challenges, in particular because the Roman land-surveyors' writings
date from a much later period, i.e. the 2d century A.D. through the 5th and 6'
centuries A.D.143 Weber's primary objective, however, was to establish a
relationship between these measurement-forms and Roman public law, particularly
tax-administration." In taking the position that the methods and forms of Roman
land-surveying and allotment resulted from the particular characteristics of Roman
public administration, Weber explicitly argued against an alternative perspective,
which was that these forms and methods originated from particular ethnic or
cultural characteristics of the Roman people and their neighbors.1 45
139
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141

142
143

WEBER, DIE ROMISCHE AGRARGESCHICHTE,

supra note 105, at 102-4. On the Agrarian

Law of 111 B.C., see supra note 133.
See WEBER, DIE ROMISCHE AGRARGESCHICHTE, supra note 105, at 104, 297-352. For
Weber's final description of this transition, as transcribed through the notes of his
students in a course entitled "Outlines of Universal Social and Economic History,"
delivered in winter semester 1919-20 (i.e. right before his death), see MAX WEBER,
GENERAL ECONoMIC HISTORY 51-73 (Frank Knight trans., Dover ed. 2003) (original
English publication 1927) (1923).
WEBER, DIE ROMISCHE AGRARGESCHICHTE, supra note 105, at 107-40. For the Roman
land-surveyors' description, see generally, CAMPBELL, supra note 109.
See WEBER, DIE ROMISCHE AGRARGESCHICHTE, supra note 109, at 107-40.
See id. See also CAMPBELL, supra note 109, at xxvii-xliv.
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The bulk of Weber's Habilitation was devoted to an examination of the
status of various types of land under Roman public and private laW. 4 6 The
complexity of the underlying materials and the technicality of Weber's arguments
tender a detailed treatment beyond the scope of this article. Moreover, certain
of the arguments relied on categorizations of land developed by August Meitzen
in the course of his research, which Weber later viewed as being somewhat
inappropriate for application to ancient Rome.147 Nevertheless, even if he later
expressed a reluctance to use the same conceptual categories in describing the
Roman developments, Weber seems to have continued to adhere to the position
expressed in his dissertation concerning the fundamental nature and implications
of the developments.
The basic course of development can be summarized as follows: through a
combination of (1) detailed delineation of land-boundaries by the land-surveyors,
(2) the Agrarian Laws, (3) the operation of occupatio under Roman private law
(which transformed public land into privately owned land through active
possession and use of the land over a period of years), and (4) the practice
(developed by Julius Caesar then carried to its extreme by Augustus and his
successors) of assigning land-ownership to veteran soldiers as a reward for their
service, the Roman agerpublicuswas transformed into privately-owned land, or
its equivalent in the form of long-term, inheritable leaseholds.148 The
combination of certain, enforceable boundaries across such a vast expanse of
land, along with the long-term property interests provided by formal ownership
or long-term, inheritable and transferable possession under leaseholds of various
kinds, enabled an extensive commerce in land-tides to emerge, with the result
that Rome became a center for profit-oriented (capitalistic) exchange in landed
property and related tax-farming opportunities.149

supra note
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See WEBER, DIE ROMIsCHE AGRARGESCHICHTE,
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See id; Jrgen Deininger, Einleitung, in WEBER, DIE ROMISCHE

105, at 141-296.
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note 105, at 17-19.
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See

THE AGRARLAN SOCIOLOGY OF ANCIENT CIVILIZATIONS, supra note 112, at 329.
DIE ROMIsCHE AGRARGESCHICHTE, supra note 105, at 187-206. See also JOHN
R. LOVE, ANTIQUITY AND CAPITALISM: MAX WEBER AND THE SOCIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS
OF RoMAN CIVILIZATION 13-22 (1991); KAsLER, supra note 14, at 28-31.
WEBER,
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B. Agrarian Property-Relations in Antiquity: Later Works
Many of the themes emerging from Weber's Habilitation would emerge in
later work as well. In 1896-1898, Weber published works on the demise of
ancient culture and agrarian relations in antiquity, followed in 1909 by a final
essay on agrarian relations in antiquity.'
The works on agrarian relations in
antiquity and the demise of ancient culture were collected together and published
posthumously by Marianne Weber in 1924.'"' Judging by the book-length essay
on agrarian relations in antiquity, Weber continued to believe that the emergence
of extensive land-ownership and long-term leaseholds in the late Roman
Republic, which was enabled to a great extent by the Roman land-surveyors,
was a deeply significant event in Roman socio-economic history, both for the
Romans themselves and for the medieval Europe that would follow.' 52
As for the origin of the "abstract ownership-concept" itself, which Weber
had identified as a vitally important object of investigation in his Habilitation,'53
he argued in his later work that its "seed" (Keim) was to be found in the absolute
"father-power" (patnapotestas) that was so distinctive and characteristic of
ancient Rome.15 4
Weber's primary point of comparison in articulating this thesis was ancient
Greek socio-legal culture,' which scholars continue to believe contained a
property-conception analogous to "possession" (possessio, Besitr), a concept of
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See KASLER, supra note 14, at 243-55.
See WEBER, AGRARVERHALTNISSE, supra note 112; THE AGRARIAN SOCIOLOGY OF
ANCIENT CIVILIZATIONS, supra note 112.
See WEBER, AGRARVERHALTNISSE, supranote 112, at 190-288; THE AGRARIAN SOCIOLOGY
OF ANCIENT CIVILIZATIONS, supra note 112, at 260-386.
See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
See WEBER, AGRARVERHALTNISSE, supra note 112, at 201-2; THE AGRARIAN SOCIOLOGY
OF ANCIENT CIVILIZATIONS, supra note 112, at 274. On the power of the paterfamilias
in ancient Rome, see THE TwELVE TABLES, TABLE IV; THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS,
supra note 37, at 1.51, 1.55; THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN I.9; THE DIGEST, supra note
37, at 1.6. See also BoRKowsm, supra note 37, at 111-19.
See WEBER, AGRARVERHALTNISSE, supra note 112, at 201-2; THE AGRARIAN SOCIOLOGY
OF ANCIENT CIVILIZATIONS, supra note 112, at 274.
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"ownership" (dominium, Eigentum) never having developed. 5 6 Although fatherpower (the power of a male head-of-extended-household over the household's
members and possessions) seems to have been characteristic of Indo-European
socio-legal culture in general,' 7 the distinctive aspect of Roman socio-legal
culture was the degree to which collective public ("state") jurisdictional power
stopped "on the threshold of the House" (an der Schwelle des Hauses) and

"Household-law" (Hausrecht, which Weber equated to dominium, was applied to
"wives, children, slaves and livestock" (familiapeauniaque)."
From this historical vantage-point, one can immediately see why Weber
continued to view the concept of ownership - with its connections to power,
domination, and legal jurisdiction - as being so significant when extended to
vast expanses of land: here is the source of territorial jurisdiction, combined
with jurisdiction over persons in a dependent relationship, which was
characteristic of medieval socio-legal culture, particularly the "manorial
dominion system.""' Such power-laden social relationships among owners
of vast land-expanses, workers who labored on their estates, and emerging
political organizations continued to excite Weber's interests throughout his
lifetime.
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HARRISON, THE LAW OF ATHENS Vol. I 200-5 (Bristol Press ed. 1998)

(1968). On the early Roman distinction between dominium and possessio, as these
applied to land, see WEBER, AGRARVERHALTNISSE, supranote 112, at 224; THE AGRARIAN
SOCIOLOGY OF ANCIENT CIVILIZATIONS, supra note 112, at 301-302.
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MALLORY, IN SEARCH OF THE INDO-EUROPEANS: LANGUAGE,
ARCHAEOLOGY AND MYTH 122-26 (1989). The entire storyline of Homer's Odyssey

centers around Odysseus' attempts to return to the household (comprised of wife,
son, slaves, other material "possessions," and political/jurisdictional power) of which
he is head, while the suitors are meanwhile attempting to take it from him. See THE
ODYSSEY Book I.
See WEBER, AGRARVERHALTNISSE, supra note 112, at 201-2; THE AGRARIAN SOCIOLOGY
OF ANCIENT CIVILIZATIONS, supra note 112, at 274. See also BORKOWSKI, supra note
37, at 111-19.
See WEBER, AGRARVERHALTNISSE, supra note, at 223-88; THE AGRARIAN SOCIOLOGY OF
ANCIENT CIVILIZATIONS, supra note 112, at 301-66. See also, supra note 140 and
accompanying text.
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C. Agrarian Property-Relations in the Early-Modern Transformation
of Central Europe
Although much of his work relating to agrarian economies focused on
antiquity, Weber also showed great interest in the fading agrarian economies of
his own day.160 His 1904 presentation to an international scholarly congress in
St. Louis provides insights with particular relevance to contemporary North
Americans, in part because it included explicit comparisons with the U.S.
agricultural situation, and also because it was intentionally crafted to acquaint
Americans with the "peculiar" characteristics of Nineteenth Century Continental
European agrarian social relationships.' 6 ' In this essay, Weber provided an especially
cogent theory as to the economic and cultural processes according to which Central
Europe made the transition from static agrarian societies to dynamic marketbased economies. The transition was not complete at the time he was writing,
and thus his observations - while tinged at times with an unpleasant German
nationalism - are invaluable in deciphering certain stages in that transition that
may no longer be visible from a contemporary vantage-point.
160

161

One of Weber's few forays into survey research was conducted in an effort to
understand the conditions of agricultural labor in East Germany. In 1891, Weber
was given a commission by the Vereinffir Soiapolitik (Social Policy Association) to
study the condition of agricultural workers in East Germany. See Keith Tribe, Prussian
Agriculture- GermanPohtics:Max Weber 1892-7, in KEITH TRIBE, READING WEBER (1989),
at 98-9; KASLER, supra note 140, at 6-7; MARIANNE WEBER, supra 110, at 128-30. His
report was to be based on two successive surveys sent by the Verein to East-German
landowners, the first of which was directed to 4,000 such landowners inquiring into the
"local conditions" of agricultural labor, and the second of which followed up with
more "impressionistic" questions directed to 562 landowners. See TRIBE, READING
WEBER, at 98-99. Apparently, 2,277 landowners responded to the first survey, and 291
to the second. See id. at 99, 125-26 n.26, 29, 31. Between 1892 and 1894 Weber
published a series of analyses of the survey results, including his final report to the
Verein, as well as additional expositions on the issue of agricultural workers. See id. at
101-16.
See Max Weber, Capitalism and Rural Society in Germany, in H.H. GERTH & C. WRIGHT
MILLS, FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 363-85 (Oxford University Press
Paperback ed. 1958) (1946) (adapted from the translation of C.W Seidenadel,
published in 1906 along with other presentations given at the Congress in a volume
titled Congress of Arts and Science, Universal Exposition, St. Louis, under the title
"The Relations of the Rural Community to other Branches of Social Science"). For
Marianne Weber's description of their trip to America, see Marianne Weber, supra
note 110, at 279-304.
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In Weber's time, German agricultural workers were placed in the inferior
social class of "peasants" (Bduerin), in sharp contrast to the U.S. "farmers," who
were viewed as entrepreneurial agricultural workers.162 Nevertheless, Weber
was quick to point out to his U.S. audience that the economic and legal situation
of peasants differed greatly between East and West Germany, and had changed
substantially over the course of Germany's history.163 The East-German peasant,
whose type had evolved to a limited extent with the emergence of capitalist
agriculture, was the Instmann.164 The Instleute were dependents of manorial
landowners: the Grundherrenof the Grundherrschaft(manorial-dominion) system. 6
This Grundherrschaftsystem had existed throughout Germany into the Sixteenth
Century, and it was the manner in which it dissolved that determined the
differences between East and West German agricultural-conditions.166
In order to conceptualize the property-relations characterizing the medieval
manorial system, it is necessary to clear one's mind of characteristically modern
notions of "property rights," and instead to imagine property-relations that
involve complex, corresponding rights-and-obkigationsamong persons with respect
to things, especially land.167 Although the "lord of the manor" (Grundherr)was
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See id. at 365.
See id. at 365-85.
See TRIBE, supra note 160, at 102-3; WEBER, supra note 161, at 374-5 (unfortunately
the English does not provide any indication of Weber's German terminology, and
thus it must be inferred that Weber is describing the Instleute here). See also, ECONOMY
AND SOCIETY, supra note 113, at 125.
See Weber, supra note 161, at 374-5.
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See id.
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Although a description of the Grundherrschaftsystem is implicit throughout Weber's
agricultural writings, he mostly assumes that his readers are familiar with that system,
and allocates his time to describing the transitions that had occurred and were still
occurring in his time. An excellent description of the system, which links it to the
Roman Imperial period and describes its evolution in great detail, with particular
discussion of the German case, is provided by Marc Bloch in Feudal Sodety. See
MARC BLOCH, FEUDAL SOCIETY 173, 241-54, 266-70 (L.A. Manyon trans. 1961). An
influential legal conception of property that includes both obligations and rights is
found in Samuel Pufendorf. See, e.g., SAMUEL PUFENDORF, ON THE DuTY OF MAN
AND CITIZEN 84-104 (Michael Silverthorne trans., James Tully ed., Cambridge
University Press 1991) (1673).
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the only true "owner" (Eigentfimer) of the land, the peasants possessed parcels
of land under long-term (effectively perpetual), inheritable leaseholds (tenures);
these leaseholds ideally provided sufficient acreage for a home and farmland
for sustenance, and were in some cases freely transferable upon payment of an
investiture fee.'68 In addition to the peasants' tenures and the landowner's home,
the overall territorial estate was divided into subcategories, based on the varying
rights and obligations attached to the type of land.' 9 Although the demesne was
exclusively the manorial lord's cultivatable land, other types of land (e.g. "arable,"
"meadow") could be cultivated by the peasant as well, subject to the preemptive
right of the lord.'70 The tenured peasants owed certain labor duties to the lord,
such as working his demesne for a set number of days in the year, as well as rents
(sometimes also described as "taxes"), but the lord was also subject to obligations
with respect to the peasants: in addition to recognizing their tenure on his estate,
the lord was considered their protector, a role that was perhaps typically exercised
through the lord's manorial courts.'
Despite its inequalities, this Grundherrschaft system had the benefit of
producing a relative unity of material-economic interest among the landlord
and his tenured peasants: both benefited when the manor was productive.' 72
Nevertheless, "maximization of production" was not the overriding goal: in
Weber's words, the question asked according to this form of social order was
"How can I give, on this piece of land, work and sustenance to the greatest
possible number of men?"17 This socio-economic and legal order would begin
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See Max Weber, Privatenqueten fiber die Lage der Landarbeiter, 4 Mitteilungen des
Evangelisch-sozialen Kongresses 3 (1892), as quoted in TRIBE, supra note 160. This
insight can be readily translated into the modern economic language of the "propertyrights" literature by noting that this structure combined fixed rents with a form of
share-cropping, the latter of which has been argued to produce the smallest deadweight
losses in production. See, e.g. YORAM BARZEL, ECONoMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY
RIGHTS, supra note 162, at 33-54.
See WEBER, supra note 171, at 367.
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to collapse around the Sixteenth Century, but according to very different processes
in East versus West Germany.'17 4
The decisive difference between East and West Germany, according to
Weber, lay in the landowners' response to capitalism's driving force: the individual
motivation to maximize profit."'7 In southern and western Germany, the
landowners responded to this motivating force by requiring increased payments
from the peasants, but they did not appropriate the peasants' tenures.'76 In
Germany's northeast, however, the landowners appropriated ("enclosed") the
peasants' tenures and began to cultivate the land themselves, hiring certain of
the dispossessed peasants as laborers to work the soil for wages. 77
The reasons for differing landowner responses to agricultural capitalism in
the Northeast versus the South and West were varied, but could be distilled
into certain common cultural, legal, and economic factors. 7" From the
perspective of culture, Germany's northeast had been characteristically affected
by a combination of west-German colonization and Slavic patriarchy, which
was distinctive in its idealization of the feudal knight (approximated most closely
by the aristocratic Junkers) and its lack of legal customs protecting the
peasantry.'7 9 Furthermore, from a legal perspective, the Northeast was distinctive
in the degree to which jurisdictional boundaries aligned with proprietary and
territorial boundaries, a condition that enabled manorial lords to exercise exclusive
jurisdiction over their peasants.18 0
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See id. at 373-85.
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In Weber's view, however, it was the economic differences that were most
important in determining the landowners' response to agricultural capitalism.'
In the South and West, population was much denser, and there were many more
market centers in the form of towns and cities.182 The communication and
financial exchange that occurred in these market centers was culturally significant,
as well as economically, because it inculcated the knowledge and desire necessary
to enable peasants to increase their agricultural yields.183 Moreover, the geography
was much more differentiated in the South and West, which enabled a greater
variety of agricultural cultivation.'84 All of these conditions enabled local trade
to flourish in the South and West, which meant that the peasants had local
markets in which to sell their wares in exchange for money to pay rents and
taxes to the landowners. 8 5
Thus, in southern and western Germany, the economic conditions were
such that landowners did not need to appropriate the peasants' tenures; the
landowners could simply require higher taxes and rents from the peasants, and
the presence of local trade meant that the peasants had the knowledge and
capacity to raise the funds needed to make the increased payments. 86 In the
Northeast, however, conditions were entirely different: the geography was
relatively undifferentiated, land-holdings were much more extensive, and marketcenters in the form of cities and towns were few and far between.'
For these
reasons, it would have been impossible for the peasants to increase their
payments, and the landowners' only option was to raise the agricultural yield by
cultivating the land themselves.' 8 In order to do so, it was necessary to
appropriate the land entirely, and thus to dispossess the peasants, thereby
transforming the Eastern peasantry into property-less laborers.
181
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In Weber's view, these cultural, legal, and economic factors determined the
shape of capitalist agricultural-transformation in Germany, so that by the time
of the French and German Revolutions (1789-99 and 1848, after which peasants
were formally regarded as being "free"), the shape of this transformation had
already been determined.'90 From the perspective of public administration, and
because he believed passionately that Germany should be a strong nation-state,
Weber found the Eastern agricultural situation untenable. 9 ' Although he argued
that additional empirical study was needed in order to accurately assess the
impact of this capitalistic agricultural transformation on peasant socialpsychological motivations, he believed it was driving the German peasantry to
emigrate from the Northeast, either into German cities or to America, in alarming
numbers. 92 This meant that migrant workers, in particular Polish workers, were
being brought onto the Northeastern estates during the labor-intensive periods
of the agricultural cycle.' Weber saw this regular influx of non-German workers
as being extremely harmful to German national self-interest, both defensively
and culturally.194
Although he did not cast the East-German landowners (the Junkers) as
villains for their response to capitalistic forces in agriculture, he did see their
cultural and economic interests as working against the German nation's
interests."' With respect to distribution of Northeastern landed property, he
believed that the German nation had a responsibility to expropriate portions of
the Junkers' land in order to establish smaller agricultural holdings in the form of
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leases from the state."' This put Weber in direct opposition to the Junkers, an
opposition consistent with his advocacy for free exchanges (Brsen)for agricultural
commodities, securities, and derivatives (including commodity futures).

D. Commercial Property-Relations in the Modern World: The Bourse
Writings
Weber's writings on the Bourse were extensive, as is evidenced by the fact
that they fill two volumes of the Max Weber Gesamtausgabe."' That these articles
were written in the 1890s is no coincidence, for it was during this period that
securities and commodities exchanges were becoming an issue of great sociolegal and economic significance, not only in Germany but also in North
America.'9 9 In Germany, commissions were established to study the exchanges,
the primary question being how and whether such exchanges should be regulated
at a national level.2 00
Utilizing data gathered by the Birsenenquetekommission, Weber took the
position that the exchanges would be beneficial to German agriculture and
agriculturally-related industry.2 0' Nevertheless, he noted that the forms of
196
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MAX WEBER STUDIES 242 (2002).
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124-51 (1997). For more specific discussions of commodities markets, see Armando
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L. REv. 473, 474-78 (1988). For a representation of the way U.S. lawyers
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commercial property being established through these exchanges were
characterized by vastly-different social relationships, relationships that were
distinctive in their impersonality, and in the degree to which they posed financial
danger to the unwary.
Weber addressed both major types of exchange: securities (Effekten, Fonds)
and commodities (Produkten, Waren) exchanges.20 2 However, it was the latter
that seem to have presented the greatest difficulties politically. 203 In particular,
the issue of "grain futures" was a matter of deep controversy, and by taking
sides on this issue Weber set himself up in opposition to the politically-powerful
Junkers.2 04
As Weber had noted in his address to the international scholars assembled
in St. Louis, the Junkers had become powerful voices for agricultural
protectionism.205 Because they perceived grain futures markets as threatening
their ability to control grain prices, and as potentially introducing great instability
into grain markets, they preferred that such financial instruments be prohibited
altogether.20 6 The Junkers were supported in this objective by the fact that jurists
were embroiled in controversy over how futures contracts should be legally
categorized; because such trades are most often completed without exchange
of the underlying commodity and involve a certain degree of speculation
regarding the direction of future commodity prices, a dominant legal perspective
of the time was that such contracts were a form of gambling, and thus void (i.e.
unenforceable).207
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In retrospect, Weber seems extraordinarily far ahead of his time in arguing
that, rather than destabilizing grain prices, grain futures would have the opposite
effect: that through the "arbitrage" of professional futures traders, the cyclical
rise and fall in grain prices resultant from seasonal gluts and dearths would be
stabilized, and the cash price for grain would reflect general information about
the grain market as opposed to merely cyclical or local conditions of supplyand-demand.208
From the perspective of this article, however, Weber's technical arguments
concerning the functioning and effects of the Bourse are less significant than
his discussion of the overall impact that the growing financial markets were
having, and would continue to have, on property-relations. These developments
were particularly emphasized in Weber's Birse I essay.209
Weber began that essay by stating that "[lt]he Bourse is an institution
(Einrichtung)of modem, high-volume, commercial trade (Grofhandelsverkebr)."21 0

After outlining the basic forms and functions of the Bourse, he then turned to
a discussion of bond markets, which were historically the first "securities" to
emerge.21 ' He discussed the fact that these markets enabled the possessoryclasses "to invest their property" (ihr Verm gen anlegen) and the state, in turn, to

208

209

210

211

See Max Weber, Die Borse II, Der Borsenverkehr, in

COLLECTED BOURSE-WRITINGS, supra
note 198, at 651-55 (English translation available in 29 THEORY & Soc. 339 (Steven
Lestition trans. 2000)). This is the contemporary argument for the benefit of futures
markets generally. For a statement of the contemporary argument, which provides
more technical detail but tracks Weber's argument conceptually, see FRANK J. FABozzi
& FRANCO MODIGLIANI, CAPITAL MARKETS: INSTITUTIONS AND INSTRUMENTS 163-87
(3d ed. 2003).
Die Borse I, Zweck und alufere Organisationder Borsen, in COLLECTED BOURSE-WRITINGS,
supra note 198, at 135-74 (English translation available in 29 THEORY & Soc. 305 (Steven
Lestition trans. 2000)). For a discussion of this essay in relation to Weber's other works
pertaining to the Bourse, see BORCHARDT, supra note 197; TRIBE, supra note 197.

See Die Brse I, Zweck und duere OrganisationderBrsen, in COLLECTED BOURSE-WRITINGS,
supra note 198, at 135 (English translation available in 29 THEORY & Soc. 305 (Steven
Lestition trans. 2000)).
See id. at 143-55. On the history of Anglo-American finance and securities markets,
see

BASKIN & MIRANTi,

supra note 199, at 55-124.
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raise funds needed for public projects.212 The implications of this development
for property-relations, the relationship between the owner of the security (the
bond) and the obligor (the state or a corporation), are extremely significant: it is
the impersonality (Unpersonichkei) of these relations that is their most important
213
(sociological) characteristic.

Weber uses the term Herrschaftin this context, which is significant for two
reasons: first because he is describing a transition from an older form of Herrschaft,
that of the Grundherr,2 14 and second because he seems to be simultaneously
evoking a legal sense (as a translation for dominium, i.e. "ownership") and a more
sociological sense, that of "domination" (or authority).21 5 In describing the
transition from Grundherrschaft to "Herrschaft 'des Kapital/" Weber describes a

transition from a hierarchical and personal property-relation, characteristic of a
by-gone era, to a property-relation that is impersonal and less hierarchical,
characteristic of the capitalistic era.21 6
The transition from agrarian property-relations to commercial propertyrelations parallels the transition from patriarchy and patrimony to bureaucracy
and modern, rational capitalism. 217 Indeed, the point may very well be that
these are the same transition, viewed through different conceptual frameworks.
Remembering that dominium is the Latin word for ownership, as well as
mastership/lordship (comparable to the German Herrschaft), we may be struck
anew by the overlap between property and domination that Weber and his
classically-trained contemporaries would have intuited immediately through the
evocations of language.
212

See Die Brse I, Zweck und duffere OrganisationderBrsen, in COLLECTED BOURSE-WRITINGS,
supra note 198, at 147 (English translation available in 29 THEORY & Soc. 305 (Steven
Lestition trans. 2000)).

213

See id. at 148.

214

See supra notes 140, - and accompanying text.

215

See Die Brse I, Zweck und duffere OrganisationderBrsen, in COLLECTED BOURSE-WRITINGS,
supra note 198, at 148 (English translationavailable in 29 THEORY & Soc. 305 (Steven
Lestition trans. 2000)).

216

See id.

217

See WEBER, supra note 8, at 941 -1110.
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Weber's exploration of domination (authority) as a sociological type concept
would come later, in his sociological phase.

E. Significance of Weber's Economic-Historical Phase for a
Sociological Theory of Property
In Weber's economic-historical phase, strictly economic and material
aspects of property-relations receive an especially vivid presentation. Agrarian
property - property connected to land and its profits - forms the base of a
conceptual framework, with commercial property (financial instruments,
business "goodwill," trade secrets) comprising a transitional development that
is sketched to illuminate contrasts or to hint at future implications. Land is
an embodied (corporeal) and tangible object of property, as are the beings
(animal and human) who work it and the improvements placed upon it. Weber's
agrarian property-relations are personal, hierarchical, and materially-rooted
social relationships.
Out from the richly-portrayed material and economic details, however,
Weber abstracted a number of interesting cultural theses. Firstly, that it was an
"ideational shift" that produced the motivational force for Rome's vast landacquisitions on the European continent, and that this was due to incentives
created by Roman public and administrative law. Secondly, that the "abstract
ownership concept" is to be credited to Roman legal culture, with its distinctivelypotent, patriarchal, "private" sphere of unfettered personal power over
dependent persons and objects. Thirdly, that the ability to communicate
knowledge and ideas to one another in local markets helped West German
peasants increase their production capacities significantly enough to pay increased
taxes on their small plots of land, thereby mitigating the perceived necessity for
appropriation by capitalistically-driven manorial lords.
Continuing a theme from his legal phase, Weber's economic-historical phase
presents property as a social phenomenon, a phenomenon characterized by social
relationships organized around specified "rights" and "duties" vis-a-vis valued
things. In his economic-historical phase, however, Weber added a richness of
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detail concerning a concrete manifestation of property that has been common
and economically-important throughout history, namely agrarian property.
In pointing to significant contrasts with commercial property, which was
rapidly becoming more important in his own day, Weber revealed the contours
of a "great transformation,
one that can be viewed as paralleling and
complementing those revealed by his sociological contemporaries.2 19 As with
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels,22 0 Weber's great transformation accords causal
force to property in society. However, with Weber the concept of property is
given fuller treatment, both analytically and empirically. Compared to Weber,
Marx's theoretical conceptualization of property is exogenous (i.e., it is taken as
given) and monolithic (private property in the form of ownership is all that is
contemplated). Weber's theory of property brings property into the theory of
social relationships (the theory "endogenizes" property), and it allows for much
more concrete detail in the diversity of rights (use, ability to profit, possession,
and ownership) and obligations comprising property.
To more fully glimpse the wealth of insight in Weber's sociological theory
of property, we now turn to the final phase of his development, the sociological
phase. Here we see the final, sociological articulation of his theory of property,
namely that property is dependent on organized social relationships that have
been closed to "outsiders." And here we see the extent to which Weber's final
development as a sociological thinker built on his earlier phases of development,
the legal and the economic-historical.
218

The phrase "great transformation" is borrowed from Karl Polanyi's work of that

title. See KARL
219

220

PoLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC

ORIGINS OF OUR TIME (Second Beacon Paperback edition 2001) (1944).
See EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY (Free Press paperback

edition 1997) (1893); KARL MARX & FREDERICK ENGELS, THE COMMUNIST
MANIFESTO (Prometheus Books 1988) (English edition of 1888); KARL MARX,
CAPITAL VOLUME 1 (Frederick Engels ed., International Publishers New World
Paperbacks edition 1967) (English edition of 1887); KARL MARX, ECONOMIC AND
PHILOSOPHIC MANUSCRIPTS OF 1844 (Martin Milligan trans., Prometheus Books
1988) (1844).
See supra note 219; see also FREDERICK ENGELS, OUTLINES OF A CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL
ECONOMY (Prometheus Books 1988) (1844).
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III.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL PHASE:
PROPERTY AND ORGANIZED SOCIAL CLOSURE

As the first decade of the Twentieth Century ended, Weber directed his
attention to sociology. In 1904, he had joined Edger Jaff6 and Werner Sombart
in assuming editorial control of the Archivfir SoZialwissenschaft und Sogialpolitik
(Archive for Social Science and Social Policy), and in the same year his essay on
the "Objectivity of Social-scientific and Socio-political Knowledge" had
appeared in that periodical.2 2 ' In 1909 Weber co-founded the German
Sociological Association (Deutsche Gesellschaftfir Soziologie), and began to
occasionally refer to himself as a "sociologist." 2 2
Early in that same year, he accepted an invitation to serve as editor for a
project to assemble a compendium of foundational concepts and principles for
"social economics" (Grundissder Sogialkonomik, hereinafter the "Outline of Social
Economics"). 223 This work was conceived as a replacement for a previous
Handbook of Political Economy (Handbuch der Politischen Okonomie), which the
publisher viewed as being somewhat out of date in relation to contemporary
developments in German and Austrian economics.2
221
222

223

224

See KAsLER, supra note 14, at 13.
See id. at 15. Weber did express ambivalence about the emerging discipline of
sociology, however, and finally withdrew in frustration from the German Sociological
Association. See SWEDBERG, supra note 8, at 173; see also MARIANNE WEBER, supra
note 110, at 420-25.
See SWEDBERG, supra note 8, at 199; see also RICHARD SWEDBERG, THE MAX WEBER
DICTIONARY 109-11 (2005). The term "social economics" was apparently suggested
by the publisher in an effort to avoid litigation that might be initiated by the heirs
of Gustav Schonberg, author of the famous Handbook of PoliticalEconomy that
Weber's Outline of Social Economics was to replace. See SWEDBERG, supra note 8, at
199-201. Weber liked the term "social economics," nevertheless, writing in a letter
dated March 22, 1912 that it is "the best name for the discipline [of economics]."
Id. at 297 n. 122.
See SWEDBERG, supra note 8, at 199-201. Despite his increasing interest in sociology,
however, Weber's scholarly engagement continued to be primarily that of an economist,
albeit an economist who (consistent with the nature of the German economic discipline
of his time) conceived of the economic sphere as situated within - and, therefore,
analytically and causally connected to - broader social and cultural contexts, including
those of politics, law, and religion. See id. at 173-206.
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Between 1910 and 1914, Weber expended considerable effort in assembling
contributions by German and Austrian economists to the Outline of Social
Economics, 225 and in composing his own contributions to the Outline.22 6 In his
correspondence and in his manuscript footnotes, Weber referred to his
contributions as Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft - Economy and Societ - and this is the
title under which Weber's manuscripts written for the Outline during this period
were posthumously published.2 27 The early manuscripts (written between 1910
and 1914) include what is now published as "Part Two: The Economy and the
Arena of Normative and De Facto Powers" (hereinafter referred to as the "1914
Manuscripts") in the English edition of Economy and Sociey, edited by Guenther
Roth and Claus Wittich.228
Weber's work from this period also includes a 1913 publication in Logos
(the Internationaljournalforthe Philosophyof Culture).229 This 1913 piece (hereinafter
the "Logos Essay") was titled "On Some Categories of Interpretive Sociology."
According to Weber, it served as a counterpart and supplement to the conceptual
exposition written in 1919-1920, posthumously published as Chapter 1 of the
finalized manuscripts submitted for publication shortly before Weber's death in
1920 (hereinafter the "1920 Manuscripts").230
225

226

Weber saw a need to incorporate both the historical perspective (then dominant in
German economics) and the analytical perspective (then identified with Austrian
economic theory) in the understanding and explanation of socio-economic phenomena.
See Swedberg, supra note 8, at 173-206.
See WOLFGANG SCHLUCHTER, RATIONALISM, RELIGION, AND DOMINATION: A WEBERIAN
PERSPECTIVE 433-63 (1989); see also Swedberg, supra note 8, at 199-203.

227
228

229

230

See Schluchter, supra note 226, at 459-60; Swedberg, supra note 8, at 298 n.126.
See Weber, supra note 8, at 309 et seq.; MAX WEBER GESAMTAUSGABE I/22; GUENTHER
ROTH, INTRODUCTION, in Weber, supra note 8, at LXVI et seq. For an argument that
the 1914 Manuscripts were nearly complete and therefore a relatively reliable source,
see Orihara, supra note 8.
Weber, GESAMMELTE AUFSATZE ZUR WISSENSCHAFTSLEHRE 403-50 (1922); originally
published in Band IV Logos, Heft 3; see KASLER, supra note 14, at 258; an English
translation was prepared by Edith E. Graber and published in 22 THE SOCIOLOGICAL
QUARTERLY 151-80 (1981) (hereinafter referred to as "THE LOGos EssAY").
Weber referred to Chapter 1 of the 1920 Manuscripts as a "simplified" version of
the Logos Essay, which he evidently still considered the more precise conceptual
exposition. See WEBER, supra note 8, at 3.
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Weber's Logos Essay articulates precise definitions for sociological
categories used throughout the 1914 Manuscripts.2 3' These categories were
developed from Rudolf Stammler's jurisprudential exposition on the
relationship between law and economics. 2 32 Nevertheless, although Weber
acknowledged the extent to which Starnnler's analytical categories served as
the starting-point for his own exposition, he positioned his contribution in
direct opposition to Stammler.2 33 Objecting to "historical materialism" as an
influence on Stammler's "disastrous" social theory, Weber characterized his
own "construction of sociological concepts" as an exposition of what Stammler
"should have meant." 2 34

A.

Sociological Categories for Understanding and Explaining
Property-Relations

Weber began the Logos Essay with the foundational declaration that
human behavior (Verbalten), like all empirical occurrences, exhibits two types
of observable patterns: (1) regularities of successive development (i.e., causal
regularities) and (2) relational structures ("complexes" or "compounds,"
Zussamenhdnge).235 What makes human behavior unique, however, is the fact
that it has meaning (Sinn) to the actors who engage in the behavior. 236 For
this reason, these empirical patterns can be interpretively explained on the
basis of certain types of inferred intentional orientation that cause actions by
individuals to exhibit regularities in relational structure and course of
development.2 37

231

See

232

WIRTSCHAFT UND RECHT: NACH MATERIALISTISCHER GESCHICHTSAUFFASSUNG

ORIHAlu,

supra note 8.

(Eilbron

Classics 2006) (1906). For Weber's discussion of his use of Stanmler, see WEBER,
supra note 229, at n.1. For a discussion of Stamnnler's (as well as a number of other
legal theorists') influence on Weber, see STEPHEN P. TURNER & REGIs A. FACTOR, MAX
233

WEBER: THE LAWYER AS SociAL THINKER (1994).
See WEBER, supra note 229, at n.1; THE LOGOS EssAY,

234

See id.

235

See WEBER,

236

See id.

237

WEBER,

supra note 229, at 403-4;

supra note 229, at 403-17;

supra note 229, at n.1.

THE LOGos EssAY, supra note 229, at 151.

THE LOGos EsSAY, supra note 229, at 151-9.

77

Vol. 6

Socio-LegalReiew

2010

These types of intentional orientation can be understood as patterns of
directedness in consciousness, cognition, and thought, i.e. in the formation of
meaning and intention.

They do not include all the unique content of a

particular individual's thoughts, emotions, or motivations.2

38

Rather, they are

general forms of thought, ways of conceptualizing choices, possibilities of
action, and probabilities of success.239 These types of intentional orientation
are inferentially interpretable by sociologists when their patterns of
directedness are (1) social (oriented to others in meaning and action) and (2)
purposive (goal-oriented).240
The type of intentionally-oriented social behavior that can be interpreted
(inferred) with the greatest degree of validity and certainty by sociologists is
behavior that is rational in the sense that the individual instrumentally and
calculatingly uses scarce means to achieve a valued end.2 4 1 In order to arrive at
a valid interpretation, a sociologist can use this type of social action as a startingpoint for analysis, explaining deviations on the basis of external causal factors
and/or differences in meaningful intention that led to the deviational empirical
pattern.2 42
Although he had some interest in isolated instances of social action, Weber's
primary interest was in patterns of ongoing socio-relational structures: social
groupings and their course of development over time. This is particularly evident
in the Logos Essay and the 1914 Manuscripts, where Weber refers to social action
as "communal action" (Gemeinschaftshandeln) and organizes his discussion on
the basis of differing types of social grouping: household, family, kinship, and
neighborhood communities, ethnic and racial communities, religious, political
and hierocratic communities, class-based-associations, status-communities, and

238
239
240
241
242

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. In Chapter 1 of the 1920 Manuscripts, Weber defined this kind of meaningful,
other-oriented behavior as "social action." See WEBER, supra note 8, at 4-22.
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the market.2 43 According to Weber, these distinctive types of social grouping
are characterized by their distinctive relationship- structures, courses of
development, and by the patterns of directedness in meaning that condition
these relationship-structures and courses of development.2"
Later, in Chapter 1 of the 1920 Manuscripts, Weber refined his categories
of social grouping, moving to a more abstract level in distinguishing two types
of "social relationships": "associative" (Vergesellschaftung) and "communal"
(Vergemeinschaftung).2 45 The difference between these two rests on the meaning
that social actors impute to the social relationship. In the case of communal
social relationships, actors subjectively regard the members of the community
as "belonging together," whereas in the case of associative social relationships,
actors regard the social relationship as a necessary means for achieving a shared

goal.2 46
Viewing social relationships from this clearly-delineated and abstracted
perspective, Weber continued to view such relationships as being characterized
by their distinctive relationship-structures, while also emphasizing patterns in
the directedness in meaning that condition these relationship-structures and
their courses of development.

243

See WEBER, supra note 229; THE LOGOS ESSAY, supra note 229; WEBER, supra note 8, at
339 et seq.; MAx WEBER, WIRTSCHAFT UND GESELLSCHAFT 181 et seq. (1925). In
both the 1920 Manuscripts and the 1914 Manuscripts, Weber was careful to state
that a shared "class situation," and especially a common situation in relation to
possession of property, is not sufficient to produce the conscious, mutual social
orientation that characterizes a communal or associative social relationship. However,
under certain circumstances a conscious, mutual social orientation might arise out of
a common possessory situation, in which case a class-based communal or associative
social relationship could arise. See WEBER, supra note 8, at 302 et seq. and 927 et seq.
For further discussion of classes and status -communities, see infra notes 332-341
and accompanying text.

244

See id.
See WEBER, supra note 8, at 40-43.
See id. Weber referred to Ferdinand Tonnies' "pioneering work" Gemeinschaft und

245
246

Gesellschaft (2d ed. 1912) in explaining his shift to using these conceptual categories.
See id. at 41; see also supra note 98 and accompanying text.
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One of the most important patterns of directedness in meaning emerges
out of the shared orientation to an "Order" (Ordnung by the members of a
social relationship.247 In his 1913 Logos Essay, Weber distinguished two types of
"Foundational Order".2 48 The first type is both fundamentally and formally
hierarchical, in the sense that it results from unilateral demands issued by some
person(s) and complied with by others. 24 9 The second type is formally egalitarian,
in the sense that it results from a mutual declaration issuing from all persons to
one another.25 0
Only in the most purely rational, limiting cases will these Foundational
Orders - their concepts, principles, and rules (Ordnungen) - be explicitly
articulated in written documents formally constituting the social relationship,
i.e. in a constitution or charter, and/or in other bylaws, regulations and contractual
documents. 5 ' Moreover, the ways that particular individuals orient themselves
to an Order (with its associated concepts, principles, and rules) may be by
refusing to comply with it, or by covertly deviating from it (e.g. cheating in a
game of cards).2 52
Nevertheless, an Order should be treated as being empirically "in force"
(Geltung) to the extent that individuals expect other individuals to behave in
accordance with the Order.25 3 This concept of the degree to which an Order is

247

248

In the 1920 Manuscripts, Weber

249

See id.

250

See id.
See id.

251

shifted his terminology slightly, adding categories

for "types of action orientation" (Usage, Custom, and Interest-Conditioned), and
discussing the bases upon which actors attribute "legitimacy" to an Order. See id. at
29-38. Despite this slight shift in terminology, Weber's discussion of Order in the
1920 Manuscripts reveals fundamental continuity with his discussion in the Logos
Essay and the 1914 Manuscripts. See also infra note 293 and accompanying text.
See THE LOGOS ESSAY, supra note 229, at 160-66.

252

See id.

253

See id. Cheating, for example, is most effective when the other players are following
the rules; on the other hand, cheating becomes logically impossible when there are no

rules. See id.
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empirically "in force" was carried over to the 1920 Manuscripts, where Weber
defined it as the "probability" (Chance) that social action will be conditioned by
the Order.25 4
Mutual orientation to an Order is vitally-important to social action because
it helps individuals to form reasoned expectations as to what their social "others"
will do, thereby enabling them to calculate their own probabilities of success in
achieving a particular goal, 255 or to deliberately conform to a command they
view as binding on them. To the extent that an Order is believed to exist and is
empirically in force, therefore, it plays a causal role in the social action of
individuals, contributing to patterns of directedness in meaning and in the
formation of socio-relational structures. 2 56
Having drawn on Weber's Logos Essay and the 1920 Manuscripts to elaborate
certain key concepts in Weber's sociology, we can now turn to his sociological
theory of property.

254

255
256

See WEBER, supra note 8, at 31.

In the 1920 Manuscripts, Weber complemented
focus on the degree to which an Order is empirically "in force" (Geltung, often
translated as "valid") with focus on the Order's bases for "legitimacy." See id. at
31-8.
See THE LOGos EssAY, supra note 229, at 160-66; WEBER, supra note 8, at 31-8.
See THE LOGOS EssAY, supra note 229, at 160-66; WEBER, supra note 8, at 31-8. There
is a complex convergence in Weber's scholarship between the concepts of meaning
and Order. One way to disentangle these may be to emphasize the notion that an
Order is a pattern of directedness in meaning. On the one hand, from this perspective,
an Order is a composite in which individual concepts and principles are viewed as
being in systematic relation to one another; it therefore has the characteristics of a
system of meanings. Indeed the German Ordnung was commonly used in legal
literature (sometimes as a substitute for the Latin ius) to evoke "the legal system."
See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Soiolo gicalJurisprudence,24 HARV. L.
REV. 591, 592 n.12 (1911). On the other hand, from this perspective, the Order
manifests itself empirically in orderedpatterns of behavior. See id. Jurists have tended
to see these two elements - an ordered system of legal concepts and rules, and the
ordered behaviors of flesh-and-blood human beings - as being connected, indeed
have sometimes assumed that they are necessarilyconnected. See id.; see also WIEACKER,
supra note 8. Very likely, Weber's complex uses of the term Ordnung reflect these
multivalent evocations in the legal tradition that he absorbed as part of his legal
training.
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B. Weber's Sociological Theory of Property
Weber discussed property-related concepts in two sections of the Logos
Essay. The first discussion is provided in the section of the essay addressing
'Associational Action",2 57 while the second discussion is provided in the section
258 These are two basic
of the essay addressing "Consensus" (Einverstandnis).
types of socio-relational structure, formed through patterns of communal social
action and corresponding to two basic types of Order.
Associational Action is a socio-relational structure formed as a result of
relatively-explicitly sharedpurposes;the members agree upon a Foundational Order
and related rules that are rationally designed to achieve the association's shared
purposes. 25 9 Consensus, on the other hand, characterizes a socio-relational
structure formed through patterns of communal action oriented to an Order
that does not arise out of agreement on shared purposes. 26 0 Individuals orient
themselves to an Order "as if' it had emerged through their agreement on
concepts and rules, even though they haven't actually agreed to anything.261
The archetypal form ("ideal type") of Associational Action, according to
Weber, is characterized by deliberate ("rational") agreement on an Order that
explicitly defines the substantive capacities and means for the collective action
of the associates in seeking to achieve the specified purposes.2 62 The resulting
association is a Zweckverein, an "intentional-association" ("goal-orientedassociation") or "voluntary association."263 In this ideal-typical form of
Associational Action, the foundational agreement recording the agreed-upon
Order - the "Charter" and By-Laws, or "Constitution" (Saqung) - will specify
which "tangible goods" (Sachgfiter)and "funds" (Leistungen) shall be administered
and made available for the stipulated purposes of the association.2 64 These
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264

See

THE LOGOS ESSAY, supra note 229, at 160-66.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id. at 166-73.
id. at 160-66.
id. at 166-73.
id.
id. at 163-65.
id. at 163. See also WEBER, supra note 8, at 41.
THE LOGOS ESSAY, supra note 229, at 163.
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goods and funds comprise the association's "special purpose fund," its
"designated property" (Zweckverm1gen).265
This is the purest, archetypal case of Associational Action, according to
Weber. 2 66 His description clearly fits a modern corporation, and this may very
well be the example that he had in mind. However, he went on to describe
certain variations that cases of Associational Action might exemplify. For
example, the agreed-upon Order (the decisive criterion, according to Weber)
might be comprised merely of ad hoc rules, or there may be no designated staff
for authorized action and enforcement. 267 An example of such a variant on
Associational Action is the monopolistic "cartel," which is an association of
independent business entities.268
As an association of independent entities, the cartel has no staff.269 Moreover,
its common Order may be relatively limited, merely specifying a litany of prescribed
or proscribed actions (e.g. prohibiting the lowering of prices). 270 Nevertheless,
because its monopoly power depends on a limitation of the number of participants,
thereby ensuring exclusivity in relation to valued resource(s) and keeping prices
high, the "cartel" is an example of a "closed" association.2 "
265

See id. In addition to designating the association's property, the enacted Order will
specify: the types of action that the association shall be authorized to execute, the
persons ("Executive Bodies," Vereinsorgane) to whom such action shall be attributed,
and the consequences that such action shall have for the association; the Executive
Bodies with responsibility for managing the association's property, and the way in
which such management is to be conducted; which services the parties to the
association shall provide; which actions by associates are permitted, prohibited, and
permitted; and the "gains" (Vorteile) that associates might anticipate as a result of
their participatory investment in the association. Finally, the enacted Order will
specify which Executive Bodies shall be given the capacity to enforce the stipulated
Order, under which conditions, and by which means (the "Enforcement Instruments,"

Zwangsapparat). See id.
266

See i.

267

See id. at 163-65.

268

See id.

269

See id.
See id.

270
271

See id. at 163-65, 172.
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Closure against additional participants can occur in associations
characterized by mutual orientation to an explicitly agreed-upon Order, and in
associations characterized by Consensus (action oriented "as if " there were an
agreed-upon Order).2 72 What matters is the fact that in both cases there is closure
against additional participants, thereby creating a de facto monopoly vis-a-vis
valued resources. 273
In the case of a "syndicate," there is some degree of ongoing association
among otherwise-independent business entities, thereby creating an ongoing
monopoly, i.e. an ongoing closure against additional participants vis-i-vis valued
resources. 2 74 It is this continued existence in time that distinguishes the syndicate
from the cartel, according to Weber.275
An ongoing monopoly, enabled by ongoing associational closure against
outsiders vis-a-vis valued resources, will involve some minimal delineation of
rules as to what is prescribed, permitted, or prohibited for participants. Therefore,
an Order will be to some degree articulated, and an organizational structure
will be to some degree created, but this may remain ad hoc rather than being
systematized. Wherever this ongoing closure against additional participants
persists, accompanied as this is by an ad hoc Order, the resulting syndicate
association will have de facto property (Vermgen), often quite extensive.2 76
The syndicate is a variant of Associational Action characterized by a lack
of staff and an ad hoc Order. An even more extreme variant is an isolated,
rational exchange (Tausch) of goods. 2 77
The exchange is isolated in the sense that it occurs only one time, and in
the absence of any explicit or implicit agreed-upon Order, let alone a staff to

272
273
274
275
276
277

See id. at 172.
See id. at 172.
See id. at 163-5, 172.
See id. at 165.
See id. at 163-5, 172.
See id. at 164-5.
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enforce the Order. There is thus no ongoing "Associational Action" at all.
Nevertheless, even in this extreme case, Weber argued that, at a minimum, the
parties to the exchange will be making an implicit agreement as to what is
prescribed, prohibited, and what is permitted.2 78 Thus, to a very limited extent,
an Order will be emergent from the exchange.2 79 What is prescribed is the transfer
of the exchanged goods, and possibly also the obligation to guarantee the
continued possession of the transferee(s) against interference by third parties.
What is prohibited is the taking-back of possession by the transferor. What is
permitted is the complete and discretionary exercise of powers of control
(efigung) over the goods exchanged.2 80
The isolated exchange does not create an ongoing association between the
parties. An exchange of goods does not result in the emergence of an "enduring
structural entity" and therefore it is neither "autocephalous" nor
"heterocephalous": there is no structural entity, and therefore there can be no
organizational "head" (cephal, from the Greek word for head).2 8' The exchange
may occur within the context of a broader associational Order, and thus be
"heteronomously ordered," as in the case of the "Market" (Markt).2 82 Or in an
extreme case it may be exclusively ordered by the bi-lateral expectations of the
parties, based on each party's "trust" (Vertrauen) that the other party will behave
in accordance with the limited Order emergent from their agreement
(autonomously ordered).283
The important point, however, is that in both cases (heteronomous and
autonomous exchange), the exchange is characterized by an implicit orientation
to the action of third parties, parties external to the parties' explicit orientation

to one another. 28 4 This renders the exchange a case of Consensus: while there is
278
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See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 165. See also WEBER, supra note 8, at 48-50.
See THE LOGos EsSAY, supra note 229, at 165.

See id.
See id.
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at least an implicit agreed-upon Order between the parties to the exchange,
there is no such agreed-upon Order in relation to third parties, at least in the
case of the autonomously ordered exchange.2 85
In the case of the autonomously ordered exchange, the parties to the
exchange assume an "as if " Order in relation to third parties. In other words,
their social action is a case of Consensual Action.286 At a minimum, the "as if"
Order enables the parties to the exchange to orient themselves to the expectation
that third parties will respect the transfer of possession (Besit.Zwechsel) that
comprises the heart of the exchange.287 In most known historical cases, however,
the exchange is heteronomously ordered by some type of organized social
relationship, the enforcement apparatus of which provides an external guarantee
against interference by third parties with stable possession of the goods
exchanged.288
Stable possession of goods, then, is necessary to exchange of goods. This
stable and reliable possession is enabled by the existence of Consensual or
Associational Action, corresponding to an "as if" or actual Order, which is "in
force" by virtue of the enforcement apparatus of some type of social community,
or at a minimum is assumed by the parties to an isolated exchange.
From this brief exposition in the 1913 Logos Essay, we already see the
basic outlines of Weber's sociological theory of property. Property - here
addressed primarily in terms of stable possession of goods in exchange and the
designated property of an intentional association (Zweckverein) - depends upon
"Ordered" social closure, thatis, closure of a social relationship against additional
participants vis-i-vis valued resources, which occurs as a result of shared
orientation to an explicit or implicit Order. Significantly, Weber argued that
this theory holds true even in the case of isolated exchange. Either the exchange
is heteronomously ordered (in which case there is an Order imposed from outside
285
286
287
288

See id.
See id. This is a category to which Weber did not refer in the 1920 Manuscripts.
See id.
See id. at 172.
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the exchange) or the exchange is autonomously ordered (in which case there is
an "as if " Order). But either way the parties exhibit patterns of directedness in
meaning through patterns in the formation, maintenance, and closure of social
relationships vis-a-vis one another, third parties, and valued resources.
An Order is an (inferred) pattern of directedness in meaning that organizes
the formation and maintenance of communal and associative social relationships,
and that directs their closure vis-i-vis valued resources. An Order therefore guides
and legitimizes the "organized social closure" that enables the formation and
persistence of exclusive "rights and obligations" vis- -vis things, which is
characteristic of property. Property and organized social closure are two sides of
the same phenomenon.28 And both are enabled by mutual orientation to an Order.

C.

Refining the Theory: The Role of an Order in Organized Social
Closure

In a manuscript titled "The Economy andthe Orders," Weber expanded on the
relationship between social action and Order, and on the distinction between
two types of "Order": (1) that which is legally correct according to the principles
and logic of jurisprudence (the "Formally-Correct Legal Order"), versus (2)
that which individuals acting in relation to one another vis-i-vis valued goods
and services subjectively regard as being in force and therefore orient themselves
to (the "Empirically-Valid Legal Order"), with the result that patterns of stable
possession and exchange emerge.290
Weber defined the "Economic Order" (Wirtschaftsordnung)as the empiricallyobservable Order that emerges from (i.e. is conditioned by) two distinct factors:
(1) the Consensus-based distribution of defacto "powers of control and disposal"

289

290

The implication is striking: everywhere organized social closure exists, property will
exist. The property may not be individual, and it may not be analogous to "ownership,"
but there will at least be stable possession of objects.
See MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 11-40 (edited and translated in
part by Max Rheinstein 1967) (hereinafter "WEBER, SOCIOLOGY OF LAW (RHEINSTEIN'S
EDITION)"); Weber, supra note 8, at 311-38.
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(Verfugungsgewalt, hereinafter "Dispositional Powers") over goods and economic
services, and (2) the ways in which such goods and services are used as a result
of these defacto Dispositional Powers.29'
Weber's primary goal in this manuscript was to show how, and to what
extent, the Empirically-Valid Legal Order impacts the Economic Order.2 92 He
also discussed various sources for the principles, rules, and concepts (Normen)
that comprise and supplement the Empirically-Valid Legal Order in a particular
community, including Conventions, Customs, and Usages, as well as ethics and
religion.293 Whatever these sources might be, the crucial attribute of all principles,
rules, and concepts comprising the Empirically-Valid Legal Order is the existence
of some type of enforcement mechanism, whether this be a formally-designated
staff or the threat of kinship-vengeance.2 94
According to Weber, the Empirically-Valid Legal Order may impact an
individual's "interests" (Interessen) in a number of ways.2 95 Of particular
importance to the economy, however, is the way in which the Empirically-Valid
Legal Order impacts the individual's calculation of his chances of stably keeping
291

See

WEBER, SOCIOLOGY OF LAW (RHEINSTEIN'S EDITION),

at 11-16. This concept of
Dispositional Powers is crucial to Weber's economic sociology, and to the connection
that he drew between law and the economy. This comes through with striking clarity
in Chapter 2 of the 1920 Manuscripts, where Weber wrote as follows:
"It is essential to include the criterion of [Dispositional Powers, Verflgungsgewalt] in
the sociological concept of economic action, if for no other reason than that at least
a modern market economy (Erwerbswirschaf) essentially consists in a complete network
of exchange contracts, that is, in deliberate planned acquisitions of [Dispositional
Powers]. This, in such an economy, is the princdalsource of the relation of economic action to
the law. But any other type of organization of economic activities would involve
some kind of de facto distribution of [Dispositional Powers], however different its
underlying principles might be from those of the modern private enterprise economy
with its legal protection of such powers held by autonomous and autocephalous
economic units."
WEBER,
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supra note 8, at 67 (emphasis added, endnote removed).
(RHEINSTEIN'S EDITION), supra note 290, at 11-40.

See WEBER, SOCIOLOGY OF LAw
See id; see also supra note 247.
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25, 39.
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economic goods under his possession and control (Ve igung), or of acquiring
such possession and control under given conditions in the future, i.e. of
maintaining and/or acquiring Dispositional Powers.296 Indeed, Weber argued,
the manipulation of such calculable chances is often what lawmakers have in
mind when they manipulate the Formally-Correct Legal Order.
When the Formally-Correct Legal Order is manipulated and therefore
changed, to the extent that it is Empirically-Valid by virtue of enforcement,
Weber argued that it can impact individual calculations as to chances of
maintaining and/or acquiring Dispositional Powers in two possible ways: (1) as
an unintended-effect (Reflexwirkung) of the principle created or manipulated
(the articulation of "Objective Law"), or (2) as a result of the intentional creation
of "Subjective Rights." 297 The existence of these Subjective Rights means that
the individual has certain calculable chances of invoking the enforcement powers
provided by the relevant social community - e.g., the political community - in
order to protect and enforce her Dispositional Powers.298
For Weber, it was very important that social science (sociology and
economics) focus on the empirical validity of law, especially the way that this
validity impacts the individual through his calculation of chances of protecting
or acquiring Dispositional Powers. 299 He sharply criticized Stammler for
confusing the Formally-Correct Legal Order with the Empirically-Valid Legal
Order.300 In order to facilitate the disentanglement of the Formally-Correct
Legal Order from the Empirically-Valid Legal Order, Weber redefined certain
crucial legal categories - possession and obligation - into their "economic"
forms. "Possession" (Besit,) in this narrow "economic" sense means simply

that the possessor can count on a lack of interference with his control (Ve/kgun)
296
297

298
299
300

See id.
See id. at 15-16. Weber significantly elaborated on this and related points in later
sections of his sociology of law. See id. at 44, 98-197; see also WEBER, supra note 8, at
644, 666-752.
See WEBER, SOCIOLOGY OF LAW (RHEINSTEIN'S EDITION), supra note 290, at 15-16.
See id. at 28-9.
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over the thing possessed.30 ' An "exchange" of goods means that this control
has been transferred, with the expectation that a roughly equivalent control
over a different good will be provided in return.302
Weber nonetheless continued to argue that the Formally-Correct Legal
Order significantly, if indirectly, impacts the Empirically-Valid Legal Order. In
the 1920 Manuscripts he stated flatly that the importance of a legal order enforced
by the "state" for the modern Economic Order, including the enforcement of
proprietary possession (Besit) and contractual exchange, cannot be
overestimated.3 03 He was also insistent, however, that the Formally-Correct
Legal Order not be treated as exogenous; the Formally-Correct Legal Order is
impacted by economic and cultural changes, albeit through processes mediated
by the culture of the legal profession and the political community.304
Beginning with the 1914 Manuscripts, Weber focused special attention on
the processes according to which different types of social groupings tend to
become closed against additional participants.30 5 In the progression of this closure,
Weber argued, the tendency is almost always to create some type of Legal Order
to govern allocation and use of valued resource(s) that are monopolized by
means of the closure against outsiders.3 06 When this happens, the social grouping
becomes a "Community of Legal Rights" (Rechtgemeinschafl), and the participants
become "right-bearing associates" (Rechtgenossen).307

Weber viewed this "enclosure process" as a type of ever-recurring sequence,
and as the basis for "Ownership" (Eigentum) of land, as well as all types of
economically-important monopolies.308 He granted that the objects monopolized
301
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See id.
See id.
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See WEBER, supra note 8, at 65, 67-8.
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See id. at 29-38, 654-8, 784-808;
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supra note 290, at 61-4, 198-223.
See WEBER, supra note 8, at 341-43.
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can vary widely - from occupational privileges to natural resources - depending
on the technical nature of the objects and the group's opportunities for
monopolization.3 09 In all such cases, however, group closure results in
monopolization vis-a-vis valued resources. By creating monopolized "rights"
to valued resources, possessed either by the group as a whole or allocated to
individuals within the group, this process results in the "Appropriation" of the
valued resources;31 0 it is the source of the creation of "property rights," including
those characteristic of Ownership.
In the 1920 Manuscripts, Weber clarified his discussion of enclosure
processes by contrasting "open" (or "public", offen) social relationships with
"closed" (geschlossen) social relationships.31 ' A social relationship may become
closed for varying reasons, he argued, ranging from tradition (arising from
ingrained habits) to intentional social action (that is, action in which a social
actor's use of particular means is explicitly directed to achieving a particular
end, which may be either a moral value or a consequentialist-materialist goal).3 12
Regardless of how the social relationship becomes closed, however, the key
outcome from a closed social relationship is the "monopolistic" control of
"appropriated opportunities" (appropriierteChancen), and these appropriated
opportunities are defined as "rights" (Rechte).313 "Ownership" (Egentum)emerges
where these appropriated rights are transmitted through inheritance, either to
individuals or to kinship groups.3 14 If the appropriated rights are freely
transferable, "free ownership" (freies Egentum) is present.31 5
309
310
311
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See
See
See
See

id.
id.
id. at 43-46.
id. For Weber's discussion of rational, affectual and traditional forms of social
action, see id. at 24-6.
See id. at 44. In Chapter II, Section 2 of the 1920 Manuscripts, Weber substantially
refined the notion of what comprises appropriated opportunities (Chancen). He argued
that these appropriated opportunities cannot be equated to the tangible or intangible
"things" from whence they arise. Rather, it is the specific ways in which these things
are (or can be) put to use, their "useful services" (Nut.leistungen) that are the
"opportunities" they present. See id. at 68-9.
See id.
See id.
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D. FurtherRefining the Theory: Different Modes of Appropriation
In both the 1914 and 1920 Manuscripts, Weber argued that the nature of
the goods or useful services appropriated through monopolization may have
extremely important implications for the patterned course of development taken
by social-relational groupings, or for a "society" in general. The nature of
appropriated goods and services is closely connected to particular "Types of
Demand-Satisfaction".31 6

In the 1914 Manuscripts, Weber had emphasized the extent to which the
"moveability" of appropriated goods conditions the course of development
within political communities. 317 In his final analysis of the processes according
to which Appropriation takes place (a discussion that consumes approximately
40 pages in Chapter 2 of Economy andSociety), Weber focused instead on historical
differences in the degree to which the services of particular offices are
appropriated, i.e. the extent to which an individual might have property-related
"rights" to a particular job-related position in society, or the extent to which he
and his labor services might be the property of another person.31 8 What is
appropriated here is a labor position, or labor services, and therefore this type
of Appropriation is closely connected to the division of labor in society.31 9
Corresponding to this type of Appropriation, Weber argued is a second type,
characterized by the ways in which the "material means of production" are
appropriated within a socio-relational grouping.32 0
The ways in which both types of Appropriation (Appropriation of labor
services and Appropriation of the material means of production) are conducted
and proceed in their course of development have enormously significant
implications for an economy, and the society within which it is ordered and
structured. 321 To use Weber's earlier terminology, particular modes of
316

See id. at 351-54.
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See id.
See id. at 114-50.
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Appropriation produce characteristic types of Economic Order, i.e. characteristic
types of Dispositional Power allocations within a society.
Moreover, through their influence on Dispositional Power allocations within
a society, distinctive types of Appropriation differentially impact the ways in
which valued goods and services may be used to achieve particular economic
goals. In other words, differing types of Appropriation result in (1) differing
types of Dispositional Power allocations, and (2) differing Types of DemandSatisfaction within a society.
In the 1920 Manuscripts, Weber drew a distinction between two economic
purposes for which appropriated Dispositional Powers over goods and services
might be acquired and used: (1) administration and consumptive sustenance of
a "budgetary unit" (Householding, Haushal), and (2) acquisition of additional
Dispositional Powers (Profit-Earning, Erwerben). These correspond to differing
methods of valuing the Dispositional Powers available, and differing ways of
regarding the total value available for use over a given period of time. For the
budgetary unit, this total value is its "property" (Vermi6gen). 3 For purposes of
Profit-Earning activity, this total value is the available "capital" (Kapital. 323
These differing conceptions of the total value of Dispositional Powers over
goods and services correspond to differing types of economic action, according
to Weber.324
To summarize, then, there are multiple distinct modes of Appropriation,
modes that are influenced by the material nature of what is appropriated at the
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In this section of the 1920 Manuscripts, Weber references legal distinctions between
"ownership" (Eigentum), possession (Besti), and the broader category of "property,"
while imputing to these distinctions his own economic-sociological content. This is
hard to see in the English translation, however. In a note, Weber clarified the distinction
between ownership and property: although both involve appropriated opportunities
with respect to tangible and intangible things, the key to "ownership" is the existence
of a legal order that guarantees stable possession and transfer across generations
through inheritance. See id. at 87, 89.
See id. at 86-100.
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same time that they are influenced by the Order to which the appropriating
members of a social relationship orient themselves in structuring their
relationship. Culture, social structure, and materiality are all in play in this complex
story of Appropriation. Distinct modes of Appropriation, in turn, have vastly
differing economic effects within society, effects that manifest themselves in
differing allocations of Dispositional Power and differing modes of DemandSatisfaction. Furthermore, distinct modes of valuing appropriated goods and
services (as household "property" or as profit-earning "capital") contribute to
economic effects by influencing the way these goods and services are used.
This is a rich and nuanced theory of the economy and of social relationships,
a theory that addresses these social phenomena in each of their three crucial
dimensions: structural, material, and symbolic. It is a sociological theory of
property, one that enables explanations of structural states anddynamic processes,
a theory that is capable of addressing property-relations and their implications
in a moment of time, and across time.

E. Topics for Further Research: The Relationship to Domination
and Class
A question that has already been foreshadowed in this article concerns the
relationship between Weber's theory of property, on the one hand, and his theories of
Domination and class, on the other. Before concluding, I will briefly survey Weber's
discussions pertaining to this question, leaving fuller treatment to a later date.
In both the 1914 and 1920 Manuscripts, Weber drew a clear distinction
between Appropriation and Dispositional Powers, on the one hand, and
Domination (Herrschaft) on the other hand.3 25 He nevertheless repeatedly
325

"Domination" is the conventional translation for Weber's Herrschaft. However, it is
interesting to note that Weber's teacher Theodor Mommsen approved the English
"sovereignty" as the translation for that term. See THE HISTORY OF ROME, BOOK I:
THE PERIOD ANTERIOR TO THE ABOLITION OF THE MONARCHY, Chapter 1 (William
Purdie Dickson translation 1894). This translation, especially Book 1, is particularly
valuable because Mommsen reviewed it, made comments on it, and approved its
final version. See id. Translator1Preface.
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noted that these may be closely connected in concrete reality. In his
manuscript addressing the relationship of Domination and Legitimacy, Weber
stated that "control (Verfigung) over economic goods, i.e. economic power
(Macht), is a frequent, often fully-intended consequence of Domination, as
well as one of its [Domination's] most important means."326 Nevertheless,
he went on to state that, while the uneven distribution of economic power
rooted in Appropriation may contribute to Domination and result from
Domination, such economic power should be analytically distinguished from
Domination.32 7
In the 1920 Manuscripts, Weber defined Domination as "the probability
that a command with a given specific content will be obeyed by a given group
of persons." 328 Domination is thus connected to the giving of rules for action,
and therefore to a hierarchically-structured Order in the sense described in
the Logos Essay.32 9 Logically, it would seem that in any case where a closed
social relationship has resulted in an Order that is enforced by a person or
persons in authority, i.e. in any case where an "Organization" in Weber's sense
has emerged, 330 both Domination and Appropriation will be present, at least
to some extent.
This logical implication is borne out by Weber's multiple discussions of
Domination. An Organization can embrace everything from the patriarchal
household (with the pater as owner and authority) to the patrimonial "manor,"
feudal "fiefs" and "benefices" - distinctive types of Domination rooted in a
Grundherr Appropriation and distribution of both land and authority - and on
to modern bureaucratic "states" and corporations, with their characteristic
patterns of Appropriation and Domination. Thus, while ownership of another's
labor and person (i.e. slavery) may be the most intuitive area of overlap between
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See id. at 942.
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See id. at 942-46.
Id. at 53; see also id. at 212-301, 941 et seq.
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Appropriation and Domination, this overlap is bound to occur in a much wider
variety of cases, as Weber's explications reveal.33'
Turning finally to Weber's concepts of "class" and "status," we see that he
draws a direct connection between these phenomena and property. Property is
frequently discussed in the outline concerning "Status Groups and Classes" in
the 1920 Manuscripts,332 and it is a dominant theme in the "Class, Status, Party"
essay of the 1914 Manuscripts. 33 3 Indeed, one of Weber's three ideal types of
class is defined by the possession of valued goods and services: it is labeled a
"possessory-class" (BesitZklasse).334
Weber's "classes" are not communities, social relationships, or groups;
rather, they are defined by a shared "class situation." 335 A shared class situation
is a common set of conditions that is, in whole or at least in part, determined by
shared rights and privileges with respect to the use, possession or ownership of
property; this shared set of property-related conditions, in turn, produces a shared
set of limitations on the possibilities for social action. 336 "Possession and lack
of possession (Besit.Zlosigkeit) are, therefore, the basic categories of all class
situations," Weber bluntly stated.33

331

332

The overlap comes into striking focus when one compares Weber's discussions of
Appropriation and Domination. See id. at 114-50, 212-301, 941 et seq. These logical
and empirical areas of overlap between Appropriation and Domination are further
reinforced by the intriguing semantic connection noted previously (see note and
accompanying text): the Latin word for "ownership" (dominium) is the same as that
used for mastership or lordship. The "lord and master" (dominus, Herr) is he who
possesses both ownership and authority (dominium, Herrschafi) over the household
and its members.
See WEBER, supra note 8, at 302-7.
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Even status - a claim to social esteem based on education or inheritance can rest on the "monopolistic Appropriation" of opportunities for acquisition;
ironically, however, status can also rest on the abhorrence of such
opportunities.

338

Status groups may arise out of shared possessory-classes.

339

More importantly, however, because it is a basis for communal identification,
status can be a motivating-force for the organized closure of a social
relationship.3 40

In such a case, status is a causal factor in the emergence of

property. The "goods and services" around which a status group might close
ranks would include such personal attributes as "honor" and "cultural prestige,"
or certain privileged activities (e.g. wearing special clothes or performing an
occupation). These are historical cases that Weber actually describes. 341
While some may find the concept of property stretched too far by considering
"honor" or "prestige" in such terms, it is worth remembering that "rights" to
honor and reputation still exist in enforceable forms in contemporary society.
Cases relating to defamation and libel, and to other personal intangibles like
privacy, are regularly countenanced in U.S. courts. And even if they aren't treated
exactly like property, astute commentators have noted intriguing parallels to
property.342
Having now surveyed Weber's sociological theory of property, and having
briefly explored its close connections to his theories of Domination and class, it
is appropriate to conclude.
338
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See id. at 305-7, 935-6.
See id. at 305-7, 932-9. In his outline in the 1920 Manuscripts, Weber stated that
"[s]tatus groups are often created by possessory-classes." Id. at 307.
See id. at 305-7, 932-9; see generaly,941-1110. Where status privilege is tied to rulership
"rights," as in the case of honoratiores,we again see the overlap between property and
Domination in Weber's theoretical framework. See, e.g., 948-52.
See id. at 305-7, 932-9;
See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 5 HARv. L. REV. 193
(1890). Weber considered status-based Appropriation of honor and privilege to be
generally hostile to the "hard bargaining" that characterizes a free market. See WEBER,
supra note 8, at 937. We can see the parallels in today's privacy and reputation
"rights": in most cases, these are not rights that people are interested in exchanging.
The case of celebrity endorsements is a clear exception.
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CONCLUSION
Max Weber died on June 14, 1920. "The earth had changed," his wife
Marianne wrote in the last line of her husband's biography.343 And it is true that
the political, social, and academic worlds have dramatically changed in the 90
years since Max Weber's death. The academic fields to which Weber directed
his attention (sociology, economics, law, political science, public administration,
history, and religious studies) are far more divided now than they were in his
time. The German nation-state that Weber so passionately defended has only
recently begun to fully recover from the moral and political depths to which it
sank after his death. And technological innovations have wrought enormous
changes in communication and social interaction. In short, the social, economic,
and political "life-worlds" of today are vastly different from those that Weber
experienced.344
And yet, I hope to have persuaded the reader that Max Weber's sociological
theory of property has much to offer to the sociology, law and economics of
today. Richard Swedberg has drawn recent attention to Weber's "economic
sociology of law."345 I wish to complement that project by drawing attention to
Weber's sociological theory of property, a theory that is richly-informed by
Weber's knowledge of law and his economic-historical research.
In tracing the developments of Weber's thought in relation to property, I
hope to have contributed to an "interpretive understanding" of his sociological
theory of property. By the time of his death, that theory was fully developed in
a form that includes dynamic and structural elements, accounting for both
materiality and "ideality" in economy and society. I believe that Weber's
sociological theory of property stands ready to be utilized in understanding and
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explaining contemporary developments in property, particularly the phenomenon
that may be the "great transformation" of our time: the emergence and expansion
of "intellectual property."
Weber began his scholarly work with a definition of property that is strikingly
similar to the "bundle of rights" definitions so commonly used by contemporary
law and economics scholars.3 46 Passing through the phases described in this
article as "legal" and "economic-historical," and borrowing richly from them,
Weber completed his investigations of property in his sociological phase. By
the end of his life, he had articulated a sociological theory of property, one that
"endogenizes" property as a social phenomenon by explaining its social conditions
and its social effects.
According to this theory, property's social conditions are minimal and
pervasive, while varying enormously in their concrete manifestations and courses
of development. These social conditions are (1) the organized social closure of
social relationships, which is (2) enabled by a valid Order. Property's social
effects depend on a greater number of conditions, which again vary significantly
in their concrete manifestations. These conditions include: (1) the modes of
enforcement and the inferred content of the Order (the concepts, rules, and
principles comprising the Order), (2) the organized structure(s) of social
relationship(s), (3) the number of co-existing organized social relationship and
their modes of interaction, (3) the nature of the goods and services appropriated,
and (4) the modes according to which appropriated goods and services are valued
(household property or profit-earning capital).
Organized social closure is a necessary, social condition for the existence
of property, according to this theory. Preeminent historical examples of this
Weberian organized social closure are corporations, cities, guilds, and nationstates. In describing the distinctive social-relationship patterns characteristic
of these organizations, as well as their distinctive patterns of development,
Weber laid a foundation for his work in Economy and Society. That foundation
began with his dissertation and ended with his lectures on GeneralEconomicHistoU.
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That Economy and Society is riddled with references to property-related concepts
is therefore no accident: from beginning to end, property rested at the heart of
Weber's scholarly work in law, economic history, and sociology.
Weber viewed the economy as being "embedded" within society, in the
sense thateconomic action is influenced by the patterns of directedness in meaning
(i.e. culture), the relationship-structures, and the material realities comprising
the broader society within which that economic action takes place. 347 Occupying
its position as part of the Formally-Correct Order - and thereby impacting the
Empirically-Valid Order - law influences patterns of directedness in meaning,
social relationship structures, and their courses of development through history.
Property - which is, from this perspective, an indirect creature of law, but which
can exist in defacto forms without law (or in spite of it) as a result of organized
social closure oriented to an "as if " Order - connects meaning and structure to
material reality. Valued objects, most of which have come from the material
world, are used, possessed, and/or "owned," and this is enabled by sociorelational structures and patterns of directedness in meaning. This use, possession
or ownership, in turn, both enables and is enabled by, patterns of power and
hierarchy that emerge and expand in socio-relational structures.
Economists and sociologists are reawakening to the importance of law.
Jurists have sophisticated theories of property, but these are not typically based
in social science. As a jurist and socio-economic theorist whose lifework
continually returned to the theme of property, Weber stands poised to help
answer the need for a theory of property that can address that phenomenon in
all of its dimensions: social, economic-historical, and legal, structural, material,
and symbolic.
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